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Abstract
The behavior of modern systems lives in a complex landscape that is unique to its
particular application. In this work we describe and analyze the behavior of two mod-
ern computational systems: a Linux server and the National Market System (NMS).
Though this work is diverse in both the type and scale of system under study, it is
unified through the design and implementation of computationally tractable quanti-
tative metrics aimed at defining the state of behavior of these systems. Understanding
the behavior of these systems allows us to ensure their desired operation. In the case
of a server we need to quickly be alerted when the system is compromised. Similarly,
we need to know when a systematic or structural change in the NMS has unintended
side-effects.
We first explore methods for host-based intrusion detection. Host-based Intrusion
Detection Systems (HIDS) automatically detect events that indicate compromise of
the host by adversarial applications. We propose and implement a full pipeline for
HIDS development on an arbitrary host system. Our methodology first learns the
sequence structure in system calls on an uncompromised host by predicting future
calls. We then use predictions from this model to detect anomalies at the application
level. Our pipeline is evaluated on an existing event sequence corpora, and PLAID.
The PLAID Lab Artificial Intrusion Dataset is a new corpus for HIDS development
we created to be more representative of modern systems. In addition, we characterize
differences in attack and baseline behavior using allotaxonographs.
Next we turn our attention to the NMS for which we propose measures to quantify
inefficiencies resulting from the geographic fragmentation of the equity marketplace.
Using the most comprehensive, commercially-available dataset of trading activity
in U.S. equity markets, we catalog and analyze quote dislocations between the SIP
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) and a synthetic BBO constructed from direct
feeds. We observe a total of over 3.1 billion dislocation segments in the Russell 3000
during trading in 2016, roughly 525 per second of trading. These dislocations do not
behave as expected, often persisting meaningfully longer and with higher magnitude
than what physical constraints suggest. These dislocations exhibit a characteristic
structure that features more dislocations near the open and close. Around 23% of
observed trades executed during dislocations leading to estimated opportunity costs
on the order of $2 billion USD. A subset of the constituents of the S&P 500 index
experience the greatest amount of opportunity cost and appear to drive inefficiencies
in other stocks.
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3.1 The NMS (lit market and ATSs) as implied by the comprehensive
market data. As we do not have the specifications of inter-market
center communication mechanisms and have minimal knowledge of
intra-market center communication mechanisms, we simply classify in-
formation as having high latency, as the SIP and lagged information
heading to the SIP do, or low latency, as the information on the direct
feeds does. Note the existence of the observer, located in Carteret NJ.
Without a single, fixed observer it is difficult to clock synchronization
issues and introduces an unknown amount of noise into measurements
of dislocations and similar phenomena. Clock synchronization issues
are avoided when using data collected from a single point of presence
since all messages may be timestamped by a single clock, controlled by
the observer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1 An illustration of our entire pipeline. Starting on the left is a testing
split consisting of attack (red) and baseline (blue) system call traces.
These are submitted to a model of normal behavior- the model is a
result of training exclusively on baseline traces. The model is first
used to obtain the probability of occurrence of each process trace in
our test set. Then we use trace metadata to group trace probabilities
by application. Finally, we test the aggregation (median) of these
grouped probabilities against a threshold θ resulting in a classification
for each program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2 ROC curves for the highest performing single model from each architec-
ture along with the highest performing ensemble on ADFA (top) and
PLAID (Bottom). Models were evaluated using both the TLAD(left)
and ALAD(right). ROC curves show the mean and standard deviation
for thirty trials. The legend reports the mean AUC and its standard
deviation. For all models ALADsignificantly improved performance. 57
5.3 Figures 5.3a to 5.3c feature ROC curves for all trained models as well as
homogenous ensembles on ADFA. Figure 5.3d shows the ROC hetero-
geneous ensembles constructed from model of all three architectures for
each hyper-parameter configuration. ROC curves show the mean and
standard deviation for thirty trials using TLAD. The legend reports
the mean AUC and its standard deviation. We note that the LSTM
and CNN/RNN ensembles under-performed some of their constituents
while the WaveNet ensembles performed better. . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
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5.4 Figures 5.4a to 5.4c feature ROC curves for all trained models as well as
homogenous ensembles on PLAID. Figure 5.4d shows the ROC hetero-
geneous ensembles constructed from model of all three architectures for
each hyper-parameter configuration. ROC curves show the mean and
standard deviation for thirty trials using TLAD. The legend reports
the mean AUC and its standard deviation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.5 Validation loss compared to performance for all models on the ADFA
dataset. Typically, one expects lower validation loss to correspond with
higher performance. Here we see no strong correlation between valida-
tion loss and performance. We note that anomaly detection results in
a special case as the training task (system call prediction), is not same
as the evaluation task (attack classification). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.6 Comparison of system call rankings between attack and baseline traces
in PLAID. Note that some of the most frequently utilized system calls,
read and close, are among the largest contributors to divergence. . 65
5.7 Rank frequency plots of system calls for attack and baseline traces in
ADFA-LD (left) and PLAID (right). Fit lines were obtained using
Huber regression. Observe that system call usage roughly follows an
exponential rank frequency distribution. This is differs from natural
language where word frequencies follow a power law distribution [1]. 68
6.1 Linear and quadratic regression between Market Capitalization (MC)
and ROC in doubly-logarithmic space. There is a strong positive re-
lationship between MC and ROC. The data exhibits interesting non-
linearity and heteroskedasticity, where equities with smaller MC have
higher variance in the dependent variable, while equities with larger
MC have generally lower variance. Note that equities in the financial
sector have a consistently lower ROC relative to MC while equities in
the energy sector have a consistently higher ROC relative to MC. The
shaded area surrounding the regression curves indicate 95% confidence
intervals for the true curves, calculated using bootstrapping techniques. 70
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6.2 We depict the dissemination of a market event to a subset of core
participants in the national market system. The left panel visualizes
the the plumbing connecting our participants; NYSE and SIP tape A
co-located in Mahwah, NJ and Nasdaq along with our observer co-
located in Carteret, NJ. All participants subscribe to both the SIP
(blue) and direct feeds (red) from both exchanges. We show the flow of
information as a sequence of enumerated events depicted as rectangular
documents. The right panel displays the best bid and offer observed by
the participants at each event from both the SIP (blue) and direct feeds
(red). Note that while Nasdaq and our observer remain in sync for this
entire example this is not always the case. We start at step zero with a
market in harmony, that is all participants observe the same price on all
feeds. Within the same microsecond NYSE processes an order resulting
in a new best bid that narrows the spread. NYSE quickly dispatches
a message of the top-of-book change to the SIP and its direct feed
customers. Five microseconds later [2, 3] NYSE’s message arrives at
the SIP which takes an additional 92µs [4] to process the information
and dispatch a new NBBO. After another five microseconds NYSE
receives the new NBBO from its co-located SIP. It’s not for another
180µs, 282µs after the original message the subscribers to NYSE’s
direct feed in Carteret receive the message. At this point we observe a
1g dislocation between the BBO displayed on the direct feeds and the
observed NBBO. This dislocation persists for 97µs at which time the
SIP update arrives in Carteret. Note that while technological advances
will result in this sequence of events unfolding faster, the core behavior
will remain unchanged. Messages from direct feeds travel a single leg,
from exchange to subscriber, while updates to the NBBO require two
legs, exchange to SIP to subscriber. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.3 Histograms of the base-10 logarithm of minimum magnitude, maxi-
mum magnitude, and duration of dislocation segments in the RexSP
without conditioning on duration or magnitude. The distributions are
leptokurtic, with the log-distributions of minimum and maximum mag-
nitude presenting a long right tail and the distribution of log-duration
displaying a rough bell-shape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
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6.4 Dislocation segments (DS) for stock pairs (similar MC) aggregated over
a year (modulo day). PBI (paired with INCR) is the smallest common
stock by MC under consideration that remained in the S&P 500 for
all of 2016. BRK.B (paired with XOM) is the only mega cap in the
RexSP. We see that DSs appear to be more concentrated for S&P 500
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6.5 Network of relationships between mutually-exclusive market categories
implied by results of four Granger causality tests. The direction of the
edges gives the direction of the Granger-causal relationship, while the
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was significant at the p = 0.05/Nlags level (the conservative Bonferroni
correction). The maximum number of lags was chosen to be Nlags = 40.
Thickness of the edge is proportional to edge weight and is plotted for
emphasis in visualization. Details about which lags were associated
with significant Granger causality can be found in Table A.12. . . . 87
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Researchers have long studied the behavior of complex computational systems. In
the cyber-security realm Behavioral Based Security (BBS) approaches are used to
detect intrusions or misuse. While in financial markets participants such as traders,
exchanges, and regulators aim to discover Stylized Facts, empirical findings that de-
scribe the system’s behavior. These market participants then apply their behavioral
understanding toward a wide variety of ends ranging from profit generation to mech-
anism design.
A common cyber-security application of BBS by both academia [5] and indus-
try [6, 7, 8] is the development of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs); tools that auto-
matically detect events indicating system compromise by malicious adversaries. IDSs
fall into one of two main categories based on their detection methodology: signature-
based or anomaly-based. The key difference in these two approaches is what behavior
is being observed and how that information is used. Signature based approaches
operate similarly to a virus scanner: they report events matching a signature, that
is a pattern of behavior, of a known attack. For example, the MITRE ATT&CK
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Framework [9] is a set of signatures, expressed as rules for detecting intrusions, that
can be used to flag events for further examination. Anomaly based approaches model
normal system behavior and report abnormal events. Signature-based IDS offer a
low false alarm rate, and do not require modeling of the system, but are unable to
detect novel attacks. The ability to detect novel attacks—i.e. ones that have not been
previously encountered—is the key advantage of anomaly-based systems.
IDSs are additionally classified by the data source they analyze. Host-based IDS
(HIDS) monitor local events on its own internals and interfaces. Network-based
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) examine network events (i.e. traffic between
hosts), rather than events occurring on a single host, and are thus distinct from HIDS.
NIDS have traditionally been simpler to deploy than HIDS, since they do not require
modifying individual hosts. However, as important services increasingly migrate to
the cloud—where the network is under the control of the cloud provider—deploying
a network-based approach for intrusion detection is often not feasible. The relative
importance of HIDS research in the intrusion detection space is therefore increasing
with the use of cloud computing.
The behavior of financial markets and their participants has long been of inter-
est to academics, traders, exchanges and regulators [10]. Securities markets, such
as the NMS, utilize auction mechanisms to facilitate the valuation and trade of as-
sets [11, 12, 13, 14]. The NMS, as of 2016, was comprised of 13 networked exchanges
coupled by information feeds of differential quality and subordinated to national reg-
ulation. Adding another layer of complexity, the NMS supports a diverse ecosystem
of market participants, ranging from small retail investors to institutional financial
firms and designated market makers. Market participants are classified primarily by
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their trading behavior [15, 16, 17].
Efficiency is perhaps the most studied behavioral trait of modern markets. To
"maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets . . . " [18] is a primary goal of market’s
chief regulatory body, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and of exchanges
who are competing against each other for market-share. Implementation details of
these markets, including the auction mechanism, computing and communication in-
frastructure, as well as information dissemination policies, impact their informational
and economic efficiency [19, 20]. The impact of market microstructure factors on
high-level outcomes has been increasingly considered in recent analyses of market
efficiency [21, 22, 23, 24]. This increased attention to market microstructure is due
in part to the rise of High-Frequency Traders (HFT) who are categorized by their ul-
tra fast timescales and sophisticated strategies that are dependent on the underlying
microstructure.
A main goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate means to understand the behav-
ior of real, large-scale computational systems. To that end we study both a modern
server deployment and the NMS. Logging the events these systems perform, be it sys-
tems calls executed or financial orders placed, results in massive datasets cataloging
the operation of these systems. Using modern data science tools such as machine
learning and big data analytics with these datasets we can categorize and quantify
the behavior of the underlying system.
The behavior we wish to quantify of course depends on our end goals, such as
determining how a new regulation impacts market efficacy. To quantify this behavior
we need to collect a dataset upon which to run our analysis. Finally, we need a
measure of success to evaluate both our analysis and the underlying metric. This
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is a highly interconnected and creative process, the data we collect determines what
analysis can be performed and vice versa. We discuss our goals for analyzing these
two systems in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. Throughout this dissertation we discuss the
decisions that were made to achieve these goals along with the rationale of our chosen
approaches.
1.1 Application 1: Host-Based Intrusion
Detection with Deep Learning
We improve the state of the art for Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS)
utilizing anomaly-detection [25]. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) aim to automat-
ically detect events indicating system compromise by malicious adversaries. Due to
the growing importance of security threats, this problem has received considerable
attention both in academic research [5] and from industry [6, 7, 8]. HIDS are a class
of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that monitor a computer system’s internals and
interfaces to detect intrusions. Systems that utilize anomaly-detection model normal
system behavior and report abnormal events. The primary alternative to anomaly-
based IDSs is signature-based. Signature based approaches operate similarly to a virus
scanner: they report events matching the signature of a known attack. For example,
the MITRE ATT&CK Framework [9] is a set of signatures, expressed as rules for
detecting intrusions, that can be used to flag events for further examination. Unlike
signature-based approaches, anomaly-based approaches can detect novel attacks, as
they are identifying changes in behavior rather than a specific attack.
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), the primarily alternative to
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HIDS, examine network events (i.e. traffic between hosts), rather than events occur-
ring on a single host, and are thus distinct from HIDS. NIDS have traditionally been
simpler to deploy than HIDS, since they do not require modifying individual hosts.
However, as important services increasingly migrate to the cloud—where the network
is under the control of the cloud provider—deploying a network-based approach for
intrusion detection is often not feasible. The relative importance of HIDS research in
the intrusion detection space is therefore increasing with the use of cloud computing.
We chose to focus on anomaly-based HIDS to create systems compatible with modern
cloud deployments that can protect against zero-day attacks.
Automated methods for HIDS are generally formulated as analyses of sequences
of system events such as bash commands or system calls [5]. System calls are the in-
terface for userspace programs to request services from the operating system’s kernel,
such as starting a new process or reading a file. In HIDS research, system call se-
quences are used as a proxy for understanding the behavior of a running program—we
assume that a malicious program will produce a very different pattern of system calls
than baseline execution of a benign program. We focus on the use of machine learning
to distinguish between malicious and baseline behavior in sequences of system calls.
1.2 Application 2: Inefficiencies in the
National Market System
In our second application we explore how the behavior of the NMS is impacted by
geographic fragmentation. We quantify the behavior for both individual securities and
mutually exclusive groups, highlighting significant differences for securities trading on
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Category Duration Magnitude Count
Dow
- - 120,355,462
> 545µs - 65,073,196
> 545µs > 1g 2,872,734
SPexDow
- - 1,126,186,592
> 545µs - 530,499,458
> 545µs > 1g 51,187,430
RexSP
- - 1,888,686,248
> 545µs - 704,416,718
> 545µs > 1g 110,447,787
Table 1.1: Total number of dislocation segments in mutually-exclusive market categories.
Number of opportunities is calculated unconditioned, conditioned on duration, and condi-
tioned on both duration and magnitude.
identical microstructure [26, 27]. We investigate a broad subset of the equities traded
in the U.S. National Market System (NMS), a network of stock exchanges located in
the U.S., since it is the proverbial center of the world equity markets. In particular,
we focus on constituents of the Russell 3000 Index, which is compiled by FTSE
International Ltd. and contains roughly 3000 of the largest equities traded on the
NMS. The selected sample represents the vast majority of the equities traded in the
U.S. and can serve as a nearly comprehensive cross-section of publicly traded equities
from which the observation and assessment of microstructure behaviors can be made.
We take a first-principles approach by compiling an exhaustive catalog of every
dislocation, defined as a nonzero pairwise difference between the prices displayed by
the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO), as observed via the Securities Informa-
tion Processor (SIP) feed, and Direct Best Bid and Offer (DBBO), as observed via
the consolidation of all direct feeds. The SIP and consolidation of all direct feeds
are representative of the displayed quotes from the national exchanges (lit market).
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1 Realized Opportunity Cost $2,051,916,739.66
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $1,914,018,654.41
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $137,898,085.25
4 Trades 4,745,033,119
5 Diff. Trades 1,124,814,017
6 Traded Value $28,031,002,997,692.75
7 Diff. Traded Value $7,077,357,462,641.67
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.71
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.25
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0651
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the realized opportunity cost (ROC) aggregated across all
studied securities and all of calendar year 2016. The total ROC of this sample is over
$2B USD. We discuss statistical characteristics of ROC extensively in Section 6.2. Row
10 shows that the average differing trade moves approximately 6.51% more value than the
average trade. This indicates a qualitative shift in trading behavior during dislocations.
Additionally, we catalog every trade that occurred in the NMS among our selected
sample in calendar year 2016, allowing an investigation of the relationship between
trade execution and dislocations. We compile a dataset of all trades that may lead to
a non-zero realized opportunity cost (ROC). We find that dislocations—times during
which best bids and offers (BBO) reported on different information feeds observed
at the same time from the point of view of a unified observer differ—and differing
trades—trades that occur during dislocations—occur frequently. We measure over
3 billion dislocation segments (DSs), events derived from dislocations between the
NBBO and DBBO. Table 1.1 shows that approximately 1.3 billion of those dislo-
cation segments are what we term actionable, meaning that we estimate that there
exists a nontrivial likelihood that an appropriately equipped market participant could
realize arbitrage profits due to the existence of such a dislocation segment. We term
any trade that executes during a dislocation a differing trade. Row 8 of Table 1.2
shows that 23.71% of all trades were differing trades. Differing trades may have been
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influenced by stale quote information, so we used them to calculate realized oppor-
tunity costs (ROC). However, some trades may have been executed in this period
intentionally, so we only include differing trades that executed at either of the two
NBBO quotes. This results in a conservative estimate of total ROC, $2,051,916,739.66
across the Russell 3000 in 2016, as depicted in Row 1 of Table 1.2.
To facilitate this analysis we use the most comprehensive dataset of NMS messages
commercially available which is effectively identical to that used by the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS).
In addition to its comprehensive nature, this data was collected from the viewpoint
of a unified observer: a single and fixed frame of reference co-located from within the
Nasdaq data center in Carteret, N.J. We are unaware of any other source of public
information (i.e., dataset available for purchase) or private information (e.g., available
only to government agencies) that is collected using the viewpoint of a single, unified
observer. Additionally, we note that despite recent technological upgrades to market
infrastructure, the chief economist at Nasdaq confirms that our bar for actionability
remains material in 2020 for the execution of latency arbitrage strategies [28].
We demonstrate that the topological configuration of the NMS entails endoge-
nous inefficiency. The fractured nature of the auction mechanism, continuous double
auction operating on 13 heterogeneous exchanges and at least 35 Alternative Trading
Systems (ATSs) [29], is a consistent generator of dislocations and opportunity cost
realized by market participants. The quantification of these dislocations establishes a
baseline to benchmark the effect of new trading venues and regulatory changes have
on market efficacy. This is especially relevant since as of writing in late 2020 two




To summarize, our primary contributions span two distinct, though related applica-
tions. In the first application we propose an alternative to trace-level anomaly detec-
tion with the ALAD algorithm, manufacture a new dataset, and apply advanced data
visualization techniques. In the second application we provide concrete definitions for
DS and ROC, apply and compare these measures across the constituents of collated
equity indices, and propose novel visualization techniques. The similarity of the con-
tributions for these two applications highlights the parallels between these domains.
In both cases we collect sequences of events, apply a metric on these sequences, then




2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) aim to automatically detect events indicating sys-
tem compromise by malicious adversaries and have been studied since at least 1980 [30].
Liu and Lang provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the systems developed since
then [5]. IDS are typically classified according to their sources of data and detection
methods.
Network- vs. host-based intrusion detection. There are two major categories
of data sources. Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are deployed at
the network level, and detect intrusions by examining network traffic. Host-based
intrusion detection systems (HIDS), which are the subject of this work, are deployed
on a single host and detect intrusions by examining events on that individual host.
NIDS have traditionally received more attention (e.g. [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]) because they are easier to deploy, more efficient, and capable of
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detecting threats across multiple hosts. HIDS have the advantage of being deployable
in a cloud setting, in which the cloud provider controls the network infrastructure,
and are capable of detecting intrusions that do not produce abnormal network traffic.
Our work focuses on HIDS.
Data & datasets. Our work is focused on detecting intrusions using sequences of
system calls. System calls are the interface for userspace programs to request services
from the operating system’s kernel, such as starting a new process or reading a file.
Forrest et al. first proposed using these sequences to detect intrusions, by collect-
ing information about “normal” patterns of system calls and detecting system call
sequences that deviate from these patterns [46]. Datasets of system call sequences
include both baseline and attack sequences. Baseline sequences are collected from pro-
grams running normally; attack sequences are collected from compromised programs
behaving abnormally (e.g. while an exploit is being used to attack the program).
Datasets of system call sequences are difficult to construct; as a result, most work
in this area is evaluated on just four datasets:
• The DARPA Intrusion Detection Dataset [47] (1998/1999)
• The KDD 99 Dataset [48] (1999)
• The UNM System Call Dataset [49] (1998)
• The ADFA-LD Dataset [50] (2012)
Unfortunately, the DARPA, KDD, and UNM datasets are too old to be of practical
use as representative of modern host processes and attacks [51]. The ADFA-LD (Aus-
tralian Defence Force Academy Linux Dataset [50]) dataset was specifically designed
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to address limitations of previously-collected datasets. In particular, they captured
system call traces on a server running a modern operating system (Linux) with real-
istic workloads (e.g. web browsing and word processing), and attack sequences gener-
ated via real vulnerabilities in commonly-used software. For these reasons, the ADFA-
LD dataset is often used for HIDS research, and previous work has demonstrated that
this realism translates into a much more challenging learning task, suggesting that
realistic datasets are vital for designing systems for practical deployment.
Nonetheless, the ADFA-LD dataset has a number of shortcomings. Since its re-
lease in 2012, typical workloads on Linux servers have changed, so the dataset is no
longer reflective of typical server behavior. The dataset was captured on an i386 host,
which though common at the time are rare in modern production environments. This
is important because the system calls used by i386 and x86_64 systems differ substan-
tially which makes it difficult to directly compare or integrate ADFA-LD traces with
those collected on modern systems. Finally, the normal traces appear to be more
reflective of a workstation, rather than server environment and are underspecified.
Each attack sequence is labeled with the process which generated it, but the baseline
sequences are not similarly labeled—so it is impossible to know what program was
used to generate each sequence.
Signature- vs. anomaly-based methods. As mentioned earlier, there are two
major methods of detection in HIDS research: signature-based methods and anomaly-
based methods. Signature-based methods are commonly used to detect malware [52,
53, 54]; though they may also be used to detect known patterns of behavior that
indicate an intrusion [45, 55]. These methods typically have low false-positive rates
and are efficient, but they can only detect known attacks. Anomaly-based methods
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detect abnormal behavior by comparing against a model of normal behavior; they have
higher false positive rates, but are capable of detecting brand-new attacks. Anomaly-
based methods have been applied both to sequences of system calls and to other kinds
of intrusion detection [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. Our work focuses on anomaly-based
intrusion detection.
IDS based on machine learning. A number of machine learning-based intrusion
detection systems have been proposed by other authors. Machine learning approaches
based on supervised learning (e.g. [45, 55, 62]) correspond to signature-based intrusion
detection: they use labeled training data including both baseline behavior and attacks
to train classifiers that distinguish between the two. These approaches cannot detect
new kinds of attacks. Approaches based on unsupervised learning (e.g. [63, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 70]) correspond to anomaly-based intrusion detection: they train models
of baseline behavior using unlabeled training data containing only baseline behavior.
Our work focuses on the use of unsupervised deep learning to perform anomaly-based
intrusion detection on system call sequences. Previous work in this area has used both
traditional (“shallow”) machine learning and deep learning to build models of benign
system call sequences. For example, approaches based on Hidden Markov Models [63,
64, 65] and support vector machines (SVM) [66, 67] have both been proposed. These
methods worked well on datasets collected in the 1990’s but performed poorly on
the more recent ADFA-LD [50]. In particular, methods that discard the ordering
information in system call sequences, including clustering and ”bag of system calls”
approaches achieve reasonable accuracy on legacy datasets but fail on ADFA-LDḊue
to this recent approaches focus on techniques that leverage ordering information, of
which deep-learning has been shown to be the most promising. Kim et al. compared
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a long short-term memory (LSTM) model which k-nearest neighbor and k-means
clustering achieving state-of-the-art performance with the LSTM [68]. Chawla et al.
use a combined convolutional / recurrent (CNN / RNN) architecture, and obtain
similar performance LSTMs with less training time [70]. These deep-learning based
approaches represent the state-of-the-art in anomaly-based HIDS, and we use them
for comparison in our empirical evaluation.
Visualisation Various visualization techniques have been used to aid human ana-
lysts and users in identifying suspicious activities and emerging threats in the cyber-
security realm [71, 72]. Recent work in the field of Complex Systems provides an-
alytical methods and corresponding visualizations for comparing various states of a
system [73]. These advances have not previously been applied in the cyber-security
domain though the divergent nature of attack vs baseline system call sequences is a
natural fit for the application.
2.2 Financial Markets
Empirical Studies of Modern U.S. Markets In a recent report to its gov-
ernment oversight committee, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
offered the following characterization of the prevailing literature which relates to our
study: “It is unsurprising that academic studies generally are narrowly focused, as the
amount of data, computing power and sophistication necessary to engage in broader
study are daunting and costly, and relevant data may not be widely available or eas-
ily accessible.” [74]. Given these constraints, we are aware of only two other recent
studies which also used comprehensive, market data to analyze modern U.S. market
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behavior and develop stylized facts.
In the first study, Wah [75] calculated the potential opportunities for latency
arbitrage on the S&P 500 in 2014 using data from the SEC’s MIDAS platform [76].
Using similar data to that for our study, Wah identified price discrepancies that
could serve as latency arbitrage opportunities. Wah located time intervals during
which the highest buy price on one exchange was higher than the lowest sell price
on another exchange, termed a “latency arbitrage opportunity” in that work, and
examined the potential profit to be made by an infinitely-fast arbitrageur taking
advantage of these price discrepancies. Wah estimates that this idealized arbitrageur
could have captured $3.0B USD from latency arbitrage in 2014, which is similar to
our conservative calculations of approximately $2.1B USD in ROC from actual trades
in 2016.
The second study was Aquilina et al. [77], which used message data from 2015
to quantify aspects of latency arbitrage in global equity markets. The authors note
the frequent yet fleeting occurrence of latency arbitrage opportunities and estimate
profits from latency arbitrage in 2018 at $4.8B USD globally, including $2.8B USD
in the U.S. equity market.
Both the Wah and Aquilina et al. studies relied on affiliations with regulatory
agencies and their respective data. This reliance on regulatory data supports the SEC
observation that “relevant data may not be widely available or easily accessible.”
Theory of market efficiency The studies above suggest that markets are not per-
fectly efficient. This proposition is further supported by O’Hara [78], Bloomfeld [79],
Budish [80], who provide evidence that well-informed traders are able to consistently
beat market returns as a result of both structural advantages and the actions of
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less-informed traders, so called "noise traders" [81]. The suggestion that an imple-
mentation of a computation system is not perfectly efficient comes to no surprise
to computer scientists but appears, at least at face value, to contradict prevailing
economic theory.
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) as proposed by Fama [82] states that asset
prices reflect all available information - the typical definition of market efficiency..
Thus, under this hypothesis it is impossible to systematically outperform the market
since prices should only adjust when new information is presented. This hypothesis
comes from analysis of 1960’s and early 1970’s transaction data. A stronger version
of the EMH proposes the incorporation of private information as well, via insider
trading and other mechanisms.
Previous studies have identified exceptions to this hypothesis [83], such as price
characteristics of equities in emerging markets [84], the existence of momentum in
the trajectories of equity prices [85], and speculative asset bubbles. Recent work by
Fama and French has demonstrated that the EMH remains largely valid [85] when
price time series are examined at timescales of at least 20 minutes and over a suffi-
ciently long period of time. However, the NMS operates at speeds far beyond that
of human cognition [86] and consists of fragmented exchanges [78] that may display
different prices to the market. More permissive theories on market efficiency, such as
the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis [87], allow for the existence of phenomena such as
dislocations due to reaction delays, faulty heuristics, and information asymmetry [19].
In line with this, the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox [88] claims that markets cannot be
perfectly efficient in reality, since market participants would have no incentive to
obtain additional information. If market participants do not have an incentive to ob-
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tain additional information, then there is no mechanism by which market efficiency
can improve. This compendium of results points to a synthesis of the competing
viewpoints of market efficiency. Specifically, that financial markets do seem to even-
tually incorporate all publicly available information, but deviations can occur at fine
timescales due to market fragmentation and information asymmetries.
Market Dislocations Fragmented markets, such as the NMS, cannot be perfectly
efficient due to physical considerations alone. The speed of information propagation
is bounded above by the speed of light in a vacuum making it impossible for infor-
mation to propagate instantaneously to spatially separated matching engines. These
physically-imposed information propagation delays lead us to expect some decou-
pling of BBOs across both matching engines and information feeds. Such divergences
were found between quotes on NYSE and regional exchanges as long ago as the early
1990s [89], in NYSE securities writ large [90], in Dow 30 securities in particular [91],
between NASDAQ broker-dealers and ATSs as recently as 2008 [92, 93], and in NAS-
DAQ listed securities as recently as 2012 [22]. U.S. equities markets have changed
substantially in the intervening years, hence the motivation for our research. It is a
priori unclear to what extent dislocations should persist within the NMS beyond the
round-trip time of communication via fiber-optic cable. A first-pass analysis of laten-
cies between matching engines could conclude that, since information traveling at the
theoretical speed of light between Mahwah and Secaucus would take approximately
372 µs to make a round trip between those locations, then dislocations of this length
might be relatively common. However, a light-speed round trip between Secaucus
and Mahwah takes approximately 230 µs and between Secaucus and Carteret takes
approximately 174 µs. Enterprising agents at Secaucus could rectify the differences
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in quotes between Mahwah and Carteret without direct interaction between agents
in Carteret and agents in Mahwah.
Several other authors have considered the questions of calculating and quantifying
the occurrence of dislocations or dislocation-like measures. In the aggregate, these
studies conclude that price dislocations do not have a substantial effect on retail in-
vestors, as these investors tend to trade infrequently and in relatively small quantities,
while conclusions differ on the effect of dislocations on investors who trade more fre-
quently and/or in larger quantities, such as institutional investors and trading firms.
Ding, Hanna, and Hendershot (DHH) [22] investigate dislocations between the SIP
NBBO and a synthetic BBO created using direct feed data. Their study focuses on a
smaller sample, 24 securities over 16 trading days, using data collected by an observer
at Secaucus, rather than Carteret, and does not incorporate activity from the NYSE
exchanges. They found that dislocations occur multiple times per second and tend
to last between one and two milliseconds. In addition, DHH find that dislocations
are associated with higher prices, volatility, and trading volume. A study by the
TABB Group of trade execution quality on midpoint orders in ATSs also noted the
existence of latency between the SIP and direct data feeds, as well as the existence of
intra-direct feed latency, due to differences in exchange and ATS software and other
technical capabilities [94].
High-Frequency Trading Other authors have analyzed the effect of high-frequency
trading (HFT) on market microstructure, which is at least tangentially related to our
current work due to its reliance on low-latency, granular timescale data and phenom-
ena. O’Hara [78] provides a high-level overview of the modern-day equity market and
in doing so outlines the possibility of dislocation segments arising from differential
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information speed. Angel [95, 96] claims that price dislocations are relatively rare oc-
currences, while Carrion [97] provides evidence of high-frequency trading strategies’
effectiveness in modern-day equity markets via successful, intra-day market timing.
Budish [80] notes that high-frequency trading firms successfully perform statistical
arbitrage (e.g., pairs trading) in the equities market, and ties this phenomenon to
the continuous double auction mechanism that is omnipresent in the current mar-
ket structure. Menkveld [98] analyzed the role of HFT in market making, finding
that HFT market making activity correlates negatively with long-run price move-
ments and providing some evidence that HFT market making activity is associated
with increasingly energetic price fluctuations. Kirilenko [15] provided an important
classification of active trading strategies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange E-mini
futures market, which can be useful in creating statistical or agent-based models
of market phenomena. Mackintosh noted the effects of both fragmented markets
and differential information on financial agents with varying motives, such as high-
frequency traders and long-term investors, in a series of Knight Capital Group white
papers [23]. These papers provide at least three additional insights relevant to this
dissertation. The first is a comparison of SIP and direct-feed information, noting that
“all data is stale” since, regardless of the source (i.e., SIP or direct feed), rates of data
transmission are capped at the speed of light in a vacuum as discussed above. The
second is that the SIP and the direct feeds are almost always synchronized. That is,
for U.S. large cap stocks such as Dow 30 constituents, synchronization between the
SIP and direct feeds existed for 99.99% of the typical trading day. Stated another
way, Mackintosh observed dislocations between quotes reported on the SIP and direct
feeds for 0.01% of the trading day, or a sum total of 23 seconds distributed throughout
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the trading day. The third relevant insight from the Mackintosh papers reflects the
significance of dislocations. Mackintosh observed that 30% of daily value typically
traded during these dislocations.
For a more comprehensive review of the literature on high frequency trading and
modern market microstructure more generally, we refer the reader to Goldstein et
al. [99] or Chordia et al. [100]. Arnuk and Saluzzi [101] provide a monograph-level
overview of the subject from the viewpoint of industry practitioners.
Trade Execution Our calculations provide a conservative estimate of ROC from
actual trades in the U.S. equity markets in 2016. Therefore, we identify some relevant
literature on trade execution [102]; namely, where and when trades occur. First, trad-
ing is not instantaneous. Delays, or latencies, exist throughout the NMS. Second,
not all trading activity occurs at a national exchange or an ATS. Instead of routing
an order to one of these market venues, a broker may execute the order against the
broker’s own inventory of that stock. This process of retaining customers’ orders
internal to the brokerage is called “internalization" [103]. In addition to matching
customers’ orders against the broker’s inventory of a particular stock, internalization
also includes instances when a broker may route customers’ orders to a market-maker
under a Payment for Order Flow (PFOF) agreement. Even without charging commis-
sions for trades, brokers may generate revenue from executing trades via PFOF [104].
To mitigate potential conflicts of interest, each broker is required to ensure that its
customers’ orders execute against best prices, as determined by the NBBO.
Trade execution problems may still arise from PFOF. In a public statement
announcing its fine against a prominent market-maker, the SEC noted the use of
algorithms which were used to avoid paying best prices on internalized orders. Per
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the SEC, "these algorithms were triggered when they identified differences in the
best prices on market feeds, comparing the SIP feeds to the direct feeds from ex-
changes" [105]. The reader will note that this market state, what the SEC has iden-
tified as "differences in best prices on market feeds", is the very same state that we
have defined here as a market dislocation.
PFOF remains a controversial practice. More recently, another market-maker
settled allegations that it did not ensure best prices for the internalization of its
customers’ orders [106].
We found references to internalization and PFOF dating back to 1994, when
annual revenues from PFOF exceeded $500M USD across all U.S. brokers [107].
Some studies identified the potential for conflicts of interest from PFOF, but claimed
that these conflicts could be mitigated by the adoption of minimum tick sizes of a
penny (i.e., decimalization) [108, 109]. Though the SEC adopted decimalization in
2000 [110], PFOF remains a lucrative practice. In the first half of 2020, four brokers
in the U.S. generated more than $1B USD in revenue from PFOF [111].
Scaling Behavior As we examine the scaling behavior between DSs, market cap-
italization (MC), and ROC we discuss previous quantification’s of scaling behavior
in financial markets. Mandelbrot [112, 113] was one of the first to characterize the
scaling properties of price returns in modern markets. The scaling of returns was later
revisited by Stanley and Plerou [114], Cont [10], as well as Patzelt and Bouchard [115].
Beyond returns in price time series, additional financial variables have been found to
display scaling properties. Market indices and foreign exchange rates [116] as well as




3.1 Host-Based Intrusion Detection
Previous work has developed HIDS that operate on individual traces of system call
sequences [68, 69] using publicly available datasets [47, 48, 49, 50]. Some of these
prior works are also based on anomaly detection [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. All of these
works consider system call traces generated by an individual process; however, modern
applications often use multiple processes, and modern attacks can impact one or more
of these processes. Furthermore, existing system call corpora used to develop these
HIDS are limited and outdated. Thus, the problems we address are how to modernize
anomaly-based HIDS by incorporating analysis of multi-process applications, how to
develop algorithms and evaluation methods more relevant to modern systems and
attacks, and overall how to achieve more accurate detection of modern attacks.
We address these problems as follows. First, we present a novel approach for
building HIDS based on unsupervised deep learning. State-of-the-art in this do-
main demonstrates that models based on Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [68],
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and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [69] architectures outperform prior SVM-based
approaches and hence are the most promising technology in this space. The key
technical contribution of our approach is an application-level classifier, called ALAD
(Application-Level Anomaly Detection), to distinguish between baseline and mali-
cious behavior. ALAD groups system call sequences by program—rather than by
process, as was done in previous work [68, 69]. ALAD is simple to implement, and
in our experiments produces a statistically significant improvement in classification
compared to previous work. We describe the ALAD approach in Section 5.1.5.
Second, we collect and release a new dataset of system call sequences, with modern
attacks on multi-process applications, used to support the development of our ap-
proach and validate our results. Our new dataset, called PLAID, contains sequences
from six modern exploits and penetration techniques as well as a large collection from
normal operation. We discuss the creation of PLAID in Section 4.1.
The third main contribution of our paper is the application and evaluation of
modern sequence-to-sequence neural network architectures for anomaly detection. In
Section 5.1, we compare a state-of-the-art architecture, WaveNet [118], with replica-
tions of the LSTMs and GRUs used in prior work, using both ALAD and the trace-
level classifiers developed in previous work. We demonstrate our results on PLAID as
well as the Australian Defence Force Academy Linux Dataset (ADFA-LD) [50], used
by several closely related works [68, 69]. We completed 540 training and evaluation
trials over combinations of dataset, model, and replicate. To our knowledge this is
the largest comparison of deep learning models used in HIDS to date. We provide
open source repositories for all datasets and code1 to facilitate reproducibility.
1Repository link suppressed for double-blind review.
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In addition, we address a common critique of deep learning, that it is “black-
box”, in the sense that it structurally obfuscates model details and does not provide
practitioners with insights about why it works. We show in Section 5.4, that recent
techniques in corpora “divergence” visualization can still provide useful insights into
datasets. Specifically, we explore our new dataset along with the popular ADFA-LD
to observe differences between normal and malicious sequences. This helps to explain
the effectiveness of anomaly detection in this application.
In summary, our primary contributions are as follows:
1. Application Level Anomaly Detection (ALAD), a new classifier for groups of
system call sequences.
2. PLAID, a new dataset of modern system call sequences and attacks.
3. A comparison of modern sequence-to-sequence neural network architectures for
anomaly detection.
4. The use of rank-turbulence divergence to visualize differences in system-call
n-grams.
Note that (3) also subsumes a comparison with historical work, since [68, 69] already
demonstrated superiority of deep learning approaches as compared to other historical
approaches.
3.2 The National Market System
To understand the behavior of the NMS one must first be familiar with the infras-
tructure components and some varieties of market participants. For this reason we
24
provide a brief overview of the NMS as it stood in 2016. In particular, we note the
information asymmetry between participants informed by the Securities Information
Processor and those informed by proprietary, direct information feeds.
The U.S. equities market, known as the National Market System, is composed
of 13 National Securities Exchanges. Each exchange contributes to price discovery
through the interactions of market participants, mediated by an auction mechanism.
Another core component of the NMS is a collection of approximately 40 alternative
trading systems (ATSs) [119], also known as dark pools. ATSs provide limited pre-
trade transparency, which can allow market participants to reduce the market impact
of their trades, but have limited participation in price discovery as a result. Each
exchange and ATS accumulates orders whose execution conditions have not been
met in an order book. Resting orders are matched with incoming marketable orders
based on a priority mechanism, commonly price-time priority [120]. Traders often
have access to a variety of order types that allow them to tailor how they interact
with the market [121, 122, 123, 124]. The top of the book at each exchange, the
resting bid with the highest price and the resting offer with the lowest price, is called
the best bid and offer (BBO). BBOs from across the NMS are aggregated by one of
the Securities Information Processors (SIP) to form the national best bid and offer
(NBBO) [125, 126]. Under Regulation National Market System (Reg. NMS), trades
must execute at a price that is no worse than the NBBO, though exceptions exist
(e.g. intermarket sweep orders) [127].
Market participants in the NMS have several options of data products to fuel their
trading decisions. In addition to the dissemination of the NBBO, each SIP provides
data feeds containing all quotes and trades that occur in their managed securities.
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Information feeds offered by each exchange, referred to as direct feeds, can provide
similar information with lower latency than the SIP data feeds. Direct feeds can also
provide additional data, such as the resting volume at all price points, commonly
called depth-of-book information. Information asymmetries between data products
lead to DSs, which can impact trading decisions and outcomes.
The NMS is regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
a federal agency, and self-regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity (FINRA), a professional organization. FINRA polices its members and ensures
they adhere to SEC rules and other professional guidelines, while SEC designs, imple-
ments, and enforces rules that are intended to promote market stability and economic
efficiency. The physical structure of the NMS, in conjunction with the existence and
usage of multiple distinct information feeds, leads to the creation of DSs and associ-
ated ROC.
3.2.1 Market Participants
There are, broadly speaking, three classes of agents involved in the NMS: traders, of
which there exist essentially four sub-classes (retail investors, institutional investors,
brokers, and market-makers) that are not mutually exclusive; exchanges and ATSs,
to which orders are routed and on which trades are executed; and regulators, which
oversee trades and attempt to ensure that the behavior of other market participants
abides by market regulation. We note that Kirilenko et al. claim the existence of six
classes of traders based on technical attributes of their trading activity [15]. This
classification was derived from activity in the S&P 500 (E-mini) futures market, not
the equities market, but is an established classification of trading activity. It is not
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possible to perform a similar study in the NMS since agent attribution is not publicly
available. However, the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) is an SEC initiative (SEC
Rule 613) that may provide such attribution in the future [128]. At the time of writing
this framework was not yet constructed.
3.2.2 Physical Considerations
Contrary to its moniker, “Wall Street” is actually centered around northern New
Jersey. The matching engines for the three NYSE exchanges are located in Mahwah,
NJ, while the matching engines for the three NASDAQ exchanges are located in
Carteret, NJ. The other major exchange families base their matching engines at the
Equinix data center, located in Secaucus, NJ, except for IEX, which is based close to
Secaucus in Weehawken, NJ. The location of individual ATSs is generally not public
information. However, since there is a great incentive for ATSs to be located close
to data centers (see sections 2.2 and 5.2), it is likely that many ATSs are located
in or near the data centers that house the NMS exchanges. For example, Goldman
Sachs’s Sigma X2 ATS has its matching engine located at the Equinix data center in
Secaucus, NJ [129].
Since matching engines perform the work of matching buyers with sellers in the
NMS, we hereafter refer to the locations of the exchanges by the geographic location
of their matching engine. For example, IEX has its point of presence in Secaucus,
but its matching engine is based in Weehawken; we locate IEX at Weehawken.
This geographic decentralization has a profound effect on the operation of the NM.
We calculate minimum propagation delays between exchanges and are displayed in
Table 3.1. In constructing Table 3.1 we use estimates of propagation delays in fiber
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Straight-line Distance 34.55mi 21.31mi 16.22mi 2.56mi55.60km 34.30km 26.10km 4.12km
Light speed, one-way 185.75µs 114.57µs 87.20µs 13.76µs
Light speed, two-way 371.50µs 229.14µs 174.40µs 27.52µs
Fiber, one-way 272.44µs 168.07µs 127.89µs 20.19µs
Fiber, two-way 544.88µs 336.14µs 255.78µs 40.38µs
Hybrid laser, one-way - - 94.50µs -
Hybrid laser, two-way - - 189.00µs -
Table 3.1: The speed of light is approximated by 186, 000 mi/s (or 300, 000 km/s) and fiber
propagation delays are assumed to be 4.9µs/km. These propagation delays form the basis
for estimates of the duration required for a dislocation segment to be considered actionable,
though these figures do not account for any computing delays and thus are lower bounds for
the definition of actionable.
optic cables provided by M2 Optics [130] as well as data center locations, distances
between data centers, and one-way hybrid laser propagation delays from Anova Tech-
nologies [131].
In reality, the time for a message to travel between exchanges will be strictly
greater than these lower bounds, since light is slowed by transit through a fiber
optic cable, and further slowed by any curvature in the cable itself. The two-way
estimates in Table 3.1 give a lower bound on the minimum duration required for
a dislocation segment to be “actionable" and a more realistic estimate derived by
assuming propagation through a fiber optic cable with a refractive index of 1.47
[130]. These estimates do not account for computing delays, which may occur at
either end of the communication lines, in order to avoid speculation. In practice such
computing delays will also have a material effect on which dislocation segments are
truly actionable and will depend heavily on the performance of available computing
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hardware.
Connecting the exchanges are two basic types of data feeds: SIP feeds, contain-
ing quotes, trades, limit-up / limit-down (LULD) messages, and other administrative
messages complied by the SIP; and direct data feeds, which contain quotes, trades,
order-flow messages (add, modify, etc), and other administrative messages. The di-
rect data feeds operate on privately-funded and installed fiber optic cables that may
have differential information transmission ability from the fiber optic cables on which
the SIP data feeds are transmitted. Latency in propagation of information on the
SIP is also introduced by SIP-specific topology (SIP information must travel from a
matching engine to a SIP processing node before being propagated from that node
to other matching engines) and computation occurring at the SIP processing node.
Due to the observed differential latency between the direct data feeds and the SIP
data feed and the heterogeneous distance between exchanges, dislocation segments
are created solely by the macro-level organization of the market system. We note
that in the intervening years since data was collected for analysis, the SIP has been
upgraded substantially to lower latency arising from computation at SIP processing
nodes. Our understanding of the physical layout of the NMS is depicted in Fig. 3.1
at a relatively high level.
There are three basic types of information flow within the NMS:
a. Direct feed information, which flows to anyone who subscribes to it. Direct
feed information is associated with non-trivial costs (on the order of $130, 000
USD per month and so is used primarily by exchanges, large financial firms,
and ATSs. Direct feed information thus flows to and from the exchanges (and































dashed lines are hypothesized
Figure 3.1: The NMS (lit market and ATSs) as implied by the comprehensive market data.
As we do not have the specifications of inter-market center communication mechanisms
and have minimal knowledge of intra-market center communication mechanisms, we simply
classify information as having high latency, as the SIP and lagged information heading to
the SIP do, or low latency, as the information on the direct feeds does. Note the existence of
the observer, located in Carteret NJ. Without a single, fixed observer it is difficult to clock
synchronization issues and introduces an unknown amount of noise into measurements of
dislocations and similar phenomena. Clock synchronization issues are avoided when using
data collected from a single point of presence since all messages may be timestamped by a
single clock, controlled by the observer.
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also flows to ATSs, since they require some type of price signal in order for the
market mechanism to function and may benefit from low latency data. This
was the case for at least one major ATS, Goldman Sachs’s Sigma X2, as of May
2019, so it is plausible that it is true for others [129]. The direct feeds provide
the fastest means by which to acquire a price signal, and thus may provide the
best economic value to traders dependent on frequent information updates; this
provides the economic foundation for our hypothesis.
b. SIP information, which is considerably less expensive than direct feed informa-
tion and exists by regulatory mandate. However, market participants may still
subscribe to the SIP as a tool for use in arbitrage; see Section 2.2 for discussion
of this possibility. Market participants that choose not to purchase the direct
feed data might also choose to purchase the SIP data for use as a price signal
and as a backup to the consolidated direct feeds. At least one ATS, Goldman
Sachs’s Sigma X2, uses SIP data as a backup to direct feed data and combines
both data sources to construct their local BBO [129].
c. Lagged reporting data that is not yet collated by the SIP. Regulation requires
that exchanges report all local quote and trade activity, and that ATSs report
all trade activity. This information is collected by the appropriate SIP tapes
and then disseminated through the SIP data feeds. It is the responsibility of the
exchanges to report their quote and trade information to the SIP, and of ATSs
to report their trade information to FINRA Trade Reporting Facilities (TRF).
Thus, though this information will be eventually visible to all subscribers to
SIP or direct feed data, it differs qualitatively from that data due to its lagged
nature.
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For example, suppose a trade occurs at NYSE MKT on a NASDAQ-listed se-
curity that updates the NBBO for that security. Since this trade occurs at
Mahwah, it takes a non-negligible amount of time for the information to prop-
agate to SIP Tape C, located in Carteret. However, traders located at Mahwah
have access to this information more quickly, possibly allowing them an infor-




The collection and curation of datasets is perhaps the most important aspect of any
application of data science. Knowledge of a systems behavior is learned through study
of a dataset since said behavior is not defined through a discrete set of rules. Thus,
one’s findings are only as good as the underlying data, as the saying goes garbage in,
garbage out.
In this dissertation we use multiple datasets. The core datasets catalog the systems
operation, namely copra of system calls for our Linux server, and quote and trade
messages for the NMS. Additionally, we use meta-information to isolate the behavior
of aspects of the larger system. We discuss all datasets used and considered in our
analysis here.
4.1 The PLAID Dataset
As with all machine learning techniques for IDS, our approach to training and testing
models for HIDS relies on corpora of events, in our case system calls. Since we are
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developing an anomaly detection system, training corpora must contain baseline and
attack data as described above in Section 2.1. Given the shortcomings of ADFA-LD
discussed in Section 2.1 we developed a new dataset, named PLAID, with modern
system calls, and a richer, more current set of attacks. The PLAID Lab Artificial
Intrusion Dataset is an open source dataset intended to support the work described
here, and to support research in the broader community. PLAID features modern
exploits carried out against a contemporary Linux server deployment, and is publicly
available [132].
4.1.1 Host Configuration
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS [133] was selected as the host Operating System (OS) for PLAID.
Ubuntu is a secure modern Linux distribution, and the most popular choice of OS for
use on public clouds such as AWS and Microsoft Azure.
Commonly used remote administrative services FTP and SSH [134] were installed
through Ubuntu’s default package manager and enabled with their default configu-
rations. Redis Version 4.0.14 [135] an open source in-memory data structure store
was manually installed on the host and configured to allow connections on the local
network. A malicious client side executable [136] was placed on the machine, simu-
lating a successful social engineering attack. Nginx Version 1.14.0 [137] and php-fpm
Version 7.1.33 [138] were installed on the host and configured to serve a basic website,
a common deployment of the world’s most popular web server [139].
This host configuration represents a reasonable approximation of a modern pro-




Our experiment testbed consists of three Virtual Machines (VMs): our host, an
attack machine, and a router. The attack VM is an instance of Kali 2019 [140], a
Linux distribution designed for penetration testing. We connected our attack and
host VMs on a local network through a bare-bones instance of Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
serving as a router. All three VMs were run using VirtualBox Version 6.1 [141] on a
single physical machine.
4.1.3 Attack Overview
Our host machine was exploited from six different attack vectors.
1. TheRedis attack [142] exploits a vulnerability in the “extension” functionality
provided in the Redis in-memory database to execute arbitrary code. An exploit
for the vulnerability was developed in 2018 and is available in Metasploit.
2. ThePHP-FPM attack [143] (CVE-2019-11043) exploits a vulnerability present
in the combination of nginx and php-fpm to execute arbitrary code. An exploit
for this vulnerability was developed in 2019 and is available on GitHub.
3. The privilege escalation attack [144] (CVE-2016-5195, also called DirtyCow)
uses a malicious CSE that exploits a vulnerability in the Linux kernel to obtain
a shell with root privileges.
4. The brute-force attacks [145] represent the use of a traditional brute-force




System call traces were generated by starting the target application with strace—a
userspace utility capable of monitoring interactions between processes and the Linux
kernel. Each exploit was run and monitored for ten trials, fully restarting all affected
services between each trial. The result of each trial is a series of files containing system
calls for example: execve brk access access openat fstat mmap close...
Each individual file corresponds to a single process of the program’s execution and is
labeled with the process id.
Since the intended use of this dataset is the development of anomaly-based IDSs,
we require baseline data approximating normal operation. This baseline dataset was
generated by monitoring a wide variety of common operations on the host with no
active attacks in progress. Specific items in the set of common operations were chosen
for two reasons. The first is to be representative of the wide range of computational
tasks performed in modern day enterprise environments. The second is to achieve a
high degree of behavioral overlap with the previously described attacks. The chosen
baseline operations are:
• Transfer of files to and from the host using FTP
• Host access via SSH and modification of configuration files
• Simulation of web traffic using Apache Bench
• Redis interactions
• Download files from the internet with curl
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• Execution of rustup, the Rust programming language install script [146]
• PHP and Redis test suites
• Compilation of small and large programs
• Deployment of small programs that involve: reading from disk, non-trivial com-
putation, and standard IO
We encode meta-information in the directory structure in the same manner as the
ADFAdataset. The generated data was split into two top level directories- attack
and baseline. Inside the attack directory is a subdirectory for each trial labeled with
the exploit and trial ID. These subdirectories contain all collected system call trace
files from the corresponding exploit trial. Similarly, the baseline directory contains
a subdirectory for each baseline operation. These subdirectories contain all collected
system call traces associated with the baseline operation.
4.2 Equity Indices
Many of our results are centered around the components of three of the most popular
equity indices: Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P 500, and the Russell 3000. Indices
measure the performance of a bucket of securities. The choice of the underlying
securities is often to be representative of a market segment. Indices may not be
directly purchased in the same way as an equity, but may be tracked by Exchange
Traded Funds (ETFs) and mutual funds.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average, from here on referred to as the Dow, is a price
weighted index that aims to provide an overview of the U.S. economy [147]. The Dow
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consists of thirty S&P 500 constituents, covering all industries except for utilities and
transportation.
The S&P 500 is a market capitalization weighted index of 500 large US based
companies referred to by it’s creators as “the gauge of the market economy". The
index is considered by many to be representative of the US stock market as a whole
and is a primary holding among passive investors. To be included in the index, as of
2016, a company must meet the following criteria [148].
• Be a U.S. Company
• Have a market capitalization greater than $5.3 billion
• Be highly liquid
• Have a public float of at least 50% of outstanding shares
• Had positive earnings in the most recent quarter
• The sum of the last four consecutive quarterly earnings must be positive
• Be listed on a major exchange
Meeting these criteria does not guarantee inclusion, and failing to uphold these stan-
dards does not necessarily result in immediate expulsion from the index. S&P 500
constituents are chosen by S&P Global, and the index is updated regularly, though
not on any fixed schedule.
The Russell indexes are passively constructed (no human in the loop) based on a
transparent set of rules including [149]:
• Be a U.S. Company
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• Be listed on a major exchange
• Have a share price ≥ $1
• Have a market capitalization ≥ $30M
• Have a public float ≥ 5%
The Russell 3000 consists of the largest 3000 firms by market capitalization meeting
the above criteria, or the entire eligible set, whichever is smaller. The index undergoes
an annual reconstruction in June and is augmented quarterly with the addition of
Initial Public Offerings (IPO). This methodology results in the Russell 3000 being a
strict superset of the S&P 500.
For our analysis we focus on constituents of these indices, rather the index itself.
Thus, differing weighting methodologies used by these indices have no effect on our
analysis. We also note that some companies have multiple common stocks, one for
each share class, and that each index handles the inclusion of multiple share classes
differently.
4.3 NMS Dataset
We use a dataset comprised of every quote and trade message that was disseminated
on one of the SIP or direct feeds during the period of study. This dataset features
comprehensive coverage of the stocks under study, is collected from a single location
(Carteret, NJ), and is time stamped upon arrival, thus limiting clock synchronization
issues. Thesys Technologies collected and curated this data [150], and also provided
data for the SEC’s MIDAS [76] at the time of collection. Prior to awarding Thesys
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Group the MIDAS contract, the SEC conducted a sole source selection [151], thereby
designating Thesys Group as the only current authoritative source for NMS data.
The fact that this dataset was collected by a single fixed location allows us to
directly observe market dislocations ROC. This is unlike previous studies where sim-
ilar phenomenon could only be estimated. With the arrival timestamp we observe
information flow through the NMS in the same manner as a market participant lo-
cated at the Carteret data center. Ideally, we would have data from four different
unified observers—an observer located at each data center—so that we could compile
the different states of the market that must exist depending on physical location of
observation, but we do not believe that comprehensive consolidated data is available
from the point of view of observers located anywhere but at Carteret, hence our
selection of this location for observation.
The securities under study are categorized by meta properties including: index
membership, Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector classification,
and Market Capitalization (MC). Data on these properties was gathered using a
standard commercial Bloomberg Terminal.
The indices we consider are subject to frequent changes in membership. To sim-
plify our analysis we consider the Dow 30 and S&P 500 as they stood on Jan. 1, 2016.
For the Russell 3000 we consider the constituents as listed in the June 2016 construc-
tion, excluding those that were not publicly traded on Jan. 1, 2016. Constituents of
the indices under study were curated to only include companies that survived as a
publicly traded entity on a national exchange for the entire calendar year of 2016.
Companies that were delisted for any reason (e.g. bankruptcy or buyout) were ex-
cluded, in addition to those who were acquired by an out-of-study firm. Mergers
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between in-sample companies did not result in exclusion. Curating the stocks under
study in this way allows us to avoid issues caused by IPOs and delistings.
Many companies in our dataset changed their ticker symbol over the course of the
calendar year and thus appear as a different entity in the data. To study a company
over a long time period it is necessary to know all tickers it traded under and when
the ticker changes occurred. There is no consolidated public record of these ticker
changes, so we tracked them via an extensive review of press releases. These ticker
changes were then validated by observing changes in trading activity in the old and
new ticker on the date of the change using the Thesys data archive.
This curation reduced the Russell 3000 from 3005 stocks to 2903, the S&P 500
from 500 stocks to 472, and did not impact the 30 members of the Dow. We denote
the curated version of an existing index by appending a prime to the respective base
index (e.g. Dow 30 → Dow 30′). We then construct two additional stock groups,
RexSP and SPexDow, by taking the appropriate set difference, e.g. SPexDow = S&P
500′ - Dow 30′. Finally, all companies in our dataset were classified by their MC as it
stood in the beginning of Q4 2016 using the classes defined in Table 4.1. Our dataset
covers approximately 98% of all publicly traded U.S. equities by MC [152]. Tables 4.2
and 4.3 provide summary statistics and distribution of these equities across GICS
sector, MC, and market category, for several indices.
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Class Statistic Russ 3K′ RexSP S&P 500′ SPexDow Dow 30′
Nano
% by # 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
% by MC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Count 4 4 0 0 0
Micro
% by # 11.51 13.74 0.00 0.00 0.00
% by MC 0.26 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Count 334 334 0 0 0
Small
% by # 42.89 51.13 0.42 0.45 0.00
% by MC 4.37 18.50 0.01 0.02 0.00
Count 1,245 1,243 2 2 0
Mid
% by # 30.35 32.21 20.76 22.17 0.00
% by MC 15.11 53.19 3.37 4.72 0.00
Count 881 783 98 98 0
Large
% by # 14.50 2.71 75.21 75.79 66.67
% by MC 56.68 20.72 67.77 77.59 43.28
Count 421 66 355 335 20
Mega
% by # 0.62 0.04 3.60 1.58 33.33
% by MC 23.58 6.50 28.85 17.67 56.72
Count 18 1 17 7 10
Table 4.1: Composition of indexes under study by market capitalization (MC) classification
as of Q4 2016. The composition of various indexes is displayed by the percentage of index
constituents that are a member of each given index (% by #) and by the weighting of those
constituents (% by MC).
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Sector Statistic Russ 3K′ RexSP S&P 500′ SPexDow Dow 30′
Consumer
Discretionary
% by # 14.92 14.52 16.95 17.19 13.33
% by MC 12.97 16.40 11.92 13.10 8.98
Count 433 353 80 76 4
($) MC Min 95,330,024 95,330,024 1,244,719,232 1,244,719,232 84,654,022,656
($) MC Max 356,313,137,152 89,539,158,016 356,313,137,152 356,313,137,152 165,862,064,128
Consumer
Staples
% by # 4.03 3.41 7.20 7.01 10
% by MC 8.54 3.83 9.99 9.69 10.74
Count 117 83 34 31 3
($) MC Min 114,570,432 114,570,432 9,794,159,616 9,794,159,616 178,815,287,296
($) MC Max 224,997,457,920 17,508,790,272 224,997,457,920 150,058,582,016 224,997,457,920
Energy
% by # 5.20 4.73 7.63 7.69 6.67
% by MC 6.57 4.71 7.14 5.83 10.40
Count 151 115 36 34 2
($) MC Min 160,502,160 160,502,160 2,427,903,232 2,427,903,232 222,190,436,352
($) MC Max 374,280,552,448 27,468,929,024 374,280,552,448 116,800,331,776 374,280,552,448
Financials
% by # 17.81 18.84 12.50 12.44 13.33
% by MC 15.17 21.99 13.07 14.73 8.91
Count 517 458 59 55 4
($) MC Min 89,903,488 89,903,488 3,021,111,552 3,021,111,552 34,774,474,752
($) MC Max 401,644,421,120 401,644,421,120 308,768,440,320 276,779,139,072 308,768,440,320
Health Care
% by # 15.23 15.84 12.08 11.99 13.33
% by MC 12.49 9.12 13.53 13.19 14.38
Count 442 385 57 53 4
($) MC Min 21,050,850 21,050,850 1,478,593,408 1,478,593,408 152,328,667,136
($) MC Max 313,432,473,600 18,889,377,792 313,432,473,600 108,768,911,360 313,432,473,600
Industrials
% by # 13.47 13.41 13.77 13.57 16.67
% by MC 10.40 11.03 10.20 9.91 10.94
Count 391 326 65 60 5
($) MC Min 58,695,636 58,695,636 2,821,674,240 2,821,674,240 54,259,630,080
($) MC Max 279,545,937,920 13,281,452,032 279,545,937,920 100,041,220,096 279,545,937,920
Information
Technology
% by # 14.40 14.60 13.35 12.90 20
% by MC 21.40 13.81 23.74 20.93 30.74
Count 418 355 63 57 6
($) MC Min 114,370,240 114,370,240 3,334,570,240 3,334,570,240 151,697,113,088
($) MC Max 617,588,457,472 32,402,583,552 617,588,457,472 538,572,161,024 617,588,457,472
Materials
% by # 4.55 4.40 5.30 5.43 3.33
% by MC 3.26 5.83 2.47 3.02 1.11
Count 132 107 25 24 1
($) MC Min 103,733,456 103,733,456 2,823,849,728 2,823,849,728 63,809,703,936
($) MC Max 69,704,540,160 69,704,540,160 63,809,703,936 46,132,944,896 63,809,703,936
Real Estate
% by # 6.61 6.99 4.66 4.98 0.00
% by MC 3.89 8.67 2.41 3.38 0.00
Count 192 170 22 22 0
($) MC Min 161,591,616 161,591,616 7,130,559,488 7,130,559,488 0.00
($) MC Max 55,830,577,152 24,264,243,200 55,830,577,152 55,830,577,152 0.00
Telecommunication
Services
% by # 1.03 1.03 1.06 0.90 3.33
% by MC 2.40 1.82 2.57 2.09 3.79
Count 30 25 5 4 1
($) MC Min 285,299,072 285,299,072 3,964,831,488 3,964,831,488 217,610,731,520
($) MC Max 261,176,721,408 47,389,126,656 261,176,721,408 261,176,721,408 217,610,731,520
Utilities
% by # 2.76 2.22 5.51 5.88 0.00
% by MC 2.91 2.78 2.95 4.13 0.00
Count 80 54 26 26 0
($) MC Min 141,720,064 141,720,064 3,867,331,328 3,867,331,328 0.00
($) MC Max 57,253,351,424 12,880,323,584 57,253,351,424 57,253,351,424 0.00
Table 4.2: Market Capitalization (MC) statistics of equities under study broken out by Global
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector as of Q4 2016. The composition of various
indexes is displayed by the percentage of index constituents that are a member of each given
sector (% by #) and by the weighting of those constituents (% by MC). Additionally, the
MC of the smallest and largest constituent for each index in each category is displayed.
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Russ 3K′ RexSP S&P 500′ SPexDow Dow 30′
Count 2,903 2,431 472 442 30
($) MC Sum 26,217,754,755,404 6,177,292,648,268 20,040,462,107,136 14,303,673,004,544 5,736,789,102,592
($) MC Min 21,050,850 21,050,850 1,244,719,232 1,244,719,232 34,774,474,752
($) MC Max 617,588,457,472 401,644,421,120 617,588,457,472 538,572,161,024 617,588,457,472
Table 4.3: Makeup of market indexes by number of constituents as of Q4 2016. Additionally,
the Market Capitalization (MC) of the smallest and largest constituent for each index is
displayed along with the sum of all constituent MCs.
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Chapter 5
Application 1: Deep learning and
the ALAD Algorithm
5.1 Deep Learning Models and The ALAD
Algorithm
In this section we describe the ALAD algorithm, the underlying deep learning models
it uses, and our evaluation and experimental methods. We also explicitly state our
research hypotheses, as Hypotheses 1 and 2 below. We return to these hypotheses in
Section 5.3 and discuss how our experimental results support or refute them.
5.1.1 Method Overview and Definitions
Our approach to anomaly-based intrusion detection is a two stage process similar to
that of Kim et al. but differs substantially in implementation [68]. We implement
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a full detection pipeline consisting of two main stages. The first stage models the
system call language using deep neural networks trained exclusively on baseline data.
The second stage performs anomaly prediction using the model(s) from the first stage
as well as an anomaly classifier.
Trace Probability
The first stage in our pipeline is a system call language model, which specifies the
probability distribution for the next system call in a sequence given all prior system
calls in that sequence. If we have a system call trace t = x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn, we can





Recall that each event xi is a system call as described in Section 4.1. Models trained
exclusively with baseline data estimate this probability distribution for a host’s normal
operation. Thus, we can formally define a model M as a mapping from traces t to
a probability (real number) value. Details of the neural network architectures used,
and their training methodologies can be found in Sections Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.4
respectively.
Trace-Level Anomaly Detection (TLAD)
The second stage in our pipeline uses the probabilities generated by the first stage to
classify a trace as baseline or anomaly. Specifically, a modelM trained on baseline
sequences can be used to classify a trace t as anomalistic if it has low probability.
Taking the negative log ofM(t) (its negative log-likelihood) results in low values if t
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is not anomalistic, and high values if it is. A standard approach (e.g. [68]) to anomaly
detection sets a threshold θ and classifies a trace t as anomalistic if its negative log-
likelihood exceeds the threshold. Formally, trace-level anomaly detection (TLAD) is
defined as follows, given a modelM and threshold θ:
TLAD(t) =

1 if − log(M(t)) > θ
0 otherwise
Application-Level Anomaly Detection (ALAD)
A drawback of TLAD is that it considers only a single process at a time, whereas
attacks typically target applications and can impact multiple processes. We pro-
pose an algorithm that aggregates predictions for all processes associated with an
application. As discussed above in Section 4.1, process traces are endowed with ap-
plication meta-information in corpora, which we can use to group traces into sets
A as described below in Section 5.1.5. Furthermore, there is nothing special about
this meta-information, in particular it is easily available to any system in practice.
These sets A can be provided as input to our ALAD algorithm to predict whether
an application is benign or malicious. Formally:
ALAD(A) = let {t1, . . . , tn} = A
let m = median(−logM(t1), . . . ,−logM(tn))
1 if m > θ otherwise 0
Figure 5.1 illustrates our complete pipeline using ALAD.
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of our entire pipeline. Starting on the left is a testing split
consisting of attack (red) and baseline (blue) system call traces. These are submitted to a
model of normal behavior- the model is a result of training exclusively on baseline traces.
The model is first used to obtain the probability of occurrence of each process trace in our
test set. Then we use trace metadata to group trace probabilities by application. Finally, we
test the aggregation (median) of these grouped probabilities against a threshold θ resulting
in a classification for each program.
Research Hypotheses
With the above definitions in place, we can now state our explicit research hypotheses
as follows.
Hypothesis 1 WaveNet will outperform the LSTM and combined CNN/RNN archi-
tectures used in prior work [68, 70].
Hypothesis 2 ALAD will outperform TLAD as an IDS mechanism.
We discuss the performance metrics and evaluation methodology for both TLAD
and ALAD in Section 5.1.5. In Section 5.2 we compare the performance of several
models from each architecture (WaveNet, LSTM, CNN/RNN) and show how ALAD
yields significant performance improvements compared to TLAD.
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5.1.2 Model Architectures
Intrusion detection is a less-explored application for the machine learning community,
though many advances in the field are relevant. In particular, if we formulate the
anomaly-based IDS as sequence-to-sequence learning problem, then we can leverage
cutting-edge techniques from an active area of research in the deep learning commu-
nity. We investigate and compare several models that are adapted from recent deep
learning research.
All models used in this work feature the same high level layout. The integer
encoded system calls are fed into a learned embedding layer. The embedding layer
is followed by one of the architectures described above which outputs a probability
distribution over system calls at each time step.
Our first candidate model is the WaveNet architecture [118], an audio generation
model developed by Google DeepMind. WaveNet can serve as a drop-in replacement
for LSTM-based architectures, which are commonly used on sequence-to-sequence
problems. WaveNet employs discrete convolutions to capture context information and
inform predictions, rather than the recurrent connections seen in LSTMs. This allows
WaveNet to achieve superior performance with shorter training time as compared to
LSTM-based architectures.
Our second and third candidates replicate the architectures from two prior ap-
proaches performing anomaly detection on ADFA-LD. They are an LSTM language
architecture from Kim et al. [68], and the combined CNN/RNN architecture from
Chawla et al. [70]. The LSTM architecture is simply a variable number of LSTM
layers followed by dropout leading into a dense layer. The combined CNN/RNN
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model features multiple one dimension convolutional layers stacked on top of a GRU
followed by a dense layer.
We implemented these architectures in Python using TensorFlow version 2.1 [153]
and provide our source code on GitLab [132].
5.1.3 Data
We constructed separate training, testing and validation subsets for both ADFA-LD
and PLAID. A separate dense integer encoding was used for each dataset as they
were generated on machines using different instruction set architectures. The testing
sets feature a 1:1 ratio of attack and normal traces while the training and validation
sets contain exclusively normal traces.
ADFA-LD
The ADFA-LD data directory consists of three folders: attack, training and valida-
tion. Respectively, these contain 746, 833, and 4,373 system call traces of varying
lengths. The 175 unique system calls in ADFA-LD originally represented by a sparse
integer encoding are refactored into a dense encoding for computational efficiency.
The training and validation folders contain traces of normal operation while the at-
tack folder features all attack traces.
We use this data to construct our own training, testing, and validation splits
as follows. The ADFA training and validation folders are merged, consolidating all
normal traces. Our test set was created by combining the attack sequences with 746
randomly selected normal sequences resulting in a 1:1 ratio of attack and normal
sequences. The unused normal traces were then randomly split into training and
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validation sets with an 80:20 ratio resulting in 3,567 sequences selected for training
and 892 for validation. Note that the original ADFA data split is not used in this
paper and all further references to training, testing and validation refer to our own
data splits.
PLAID
Pre-processing of the PLAID dataset was done similarly. PLAID consists of two top-
level directories, attack and normal, named for the type of traces they contain. A
total of 1,494 traces with a length less than 8 or greater than 4,495 were discarded.
The remaining traces consisting of 228 unique system calls were encoded with a dense
integer representation. These bounds correspond to the smallest and largest sequences
present in ADFA-LD. The test set is constructed by combining all 1,145 remaining
attack sequences with an equal number of randomly selected normal traces. The
remaining unused normal traces are then randomly split into training and validation
sets with an 80:20 ratio resulting in 29,626 sequences selected for training and 7,407
for validation.
Complexity
We note that size of these datasets may seem small for deep learning applications;
this observation however fails to consider the size of the overall landscape. There are
kn possible system call traces of length n, where k is the vocabulary size of system
calls. The Linux kernel currently features over 300 unique system calls resulting in
over 27 million possibilities for traces of length three. With a length of 4,495 the
landscape for the largest traces under consideration is much larger than the number
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of floating-point operations the universe could have performed thus far [154]. Given
the complex landscape of system call traces, it is unsurprising that deep learning is
required to achieve state-of-the-art performance.
5.1.4 Model Training & Configuration
For each architecture described in Section 5.1.2, we build three models with differing
hyper-parameters to be used in an ensemble. The models, written Mi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and M ∈ {CNN/RNN, LSTM, WaveNet}, are ordered by increasing number of pa-
rameters.
Selecting optimal hyper-parameters is a notoriously difficult task due to the large
search space and computational cost of exploration. We used a Gaussian process
optimizer to inform the search, aiding in the selection of hyper-parameters for our
WaveNet models [155]. Ultimately we selected three WaveNet configurations all with
8 WaveNet blocks and no regularization. The models differed only by the number of
filters in each convolutional layer which were 128, 256, and 512 respectively.
For the replicated architectures we used the hyper-parameters specified in their
respective papers. For the LSTM architecture this was a single LSTM layer with 200
cells, a single LSTM layer with 400 cells, and two LSTM layers with 400 cells. The
CNN/RNN models differed in both the number of 1D convolutions 6, 7, 8 and number
of GRU units 200, 500, 600 respectively. The number of filters in each convolutional
layer was set to mach it’s WaveNet counterpart as the value was unspecified in the
original work.
We trained all of our models using the Adam optimizer [156] with a learning
rate of 0.0001. Gradient clipping with a maximum norm of 5 was applied to ensure
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training stability [157]. Models were trained for a fixed number of epochs, 300 and 30
for ADFA-LD and PLAID respectively with a batch size of 32. A differing number
of training epochs were selected for ADFA-LD and PLAID as the latter contains
over eight times for training data. By using both a fixed number of training epochs
and batch size for all models we ensured they received the same number of gradient
updates allowing for a fair architecture comparison. Sparse categorical cross-entropy
was used as the loss function for all models. The number of parameters, training
time, and other summary information for each model is detailed in Table 5.1.
5.1.5 ID Classifier Evaluation
We completed 540 evaluation trials over combinations of dataset, model, and replicate.
The nine model configurations outlined in Section 5.1.4 were trained and evaluated
for thirty replication trials on both ADFA-LD, and PLAID. Our evaluation compares
the ALAD and TLAD classification algorithms using these underlying models.
Both PLAID and ADFA-LD group traces by attack trial, allowing us to aggregate
traces at the application level. The ADFA-LD baseline data does not include program
grouping information, so we randomly sampled synthetic programs of equal size from
the normal portion of the test set. For sake of consistency, we use the same process
on PLAID.
In practice, we bootstrapped the baseline groups with thirty trials for each repli-
cate model. This mitigates statistical errors from the random sampling, such as
selection of an unrepresentative grouping. Thus, the single value result is the mean
of the bootstrapped operations.






AUC T LAD FPR T LAD
(TPR = 1)
AUC ALAD FPR ALAD
(TPR = 1)
ADFA
CNN/RNN0 552096 1:41:55 ± 2:29 29.6 ± 0.9 0.785 ± 0.006 0.843 ± 0.030 0.981† ± 0.003 0.085† ± 0.014
CNN/RNN1 2528472 2:48:15 ± 2:14 29.5 ± 0.8 0.802 ± 0.005 0.863 ± 0.076 0.985† ± 0.002 0.112† ± 0.037
CNN/RNN2 7841280 4:53:42 ± 3:25 33.1 ± 4.9 0.800 ± 0.007 0.887 ± 0.082 0.986† ± 0.002 0.120† ± 0.055
LSTM0 391376 1:43:23 ± 2:56 27.0 ± 0.8 0.726 ± 0.013 0.962 ± 0.068 0.924† ± 0.013 0.255† ± 0.060
LSTM1 1422576 2:50:30 ± 3:08 27.3 ± 0.9 0.759 ± 0.017 0.873 ± 0.070 0.964† ± 0.015 0.118† ± 0.044
LSTM2 2704176 4:36:27 ± 5:05 45.8 ± 0.5 0.793 ± 0.005 0.795 ± 0.009 0.983† ± 0.002 0.074† ± 0.010
WaveNet0 1111664 1:19:33 ± 0:48 39.3 ± 3.7 0.815 ± 0.004 0.795 ± 0.050 0.986† ± 0.001 0.144† ± 0.062
WaveNet1 4346736 2:58:54 ± 0:59 38.5 ± 3.3 0.830 ± 0.007 0.827 ± 0.038 0.993† ± 0.001 0.036† ± 0.008
WaveNet2 17206640 8:15:56 ± 3:22 45.9 ± 6.8 0.828 ± 0.017 0.837 ± 0.047 0.993† ± 0.004 0.048† ± 0.065
PLAID
CNN/RNN0 569533 1:02:58 ± 1:06 45.7 ± 7.4 0.854 ± 0.024 0.719 ± 0.209 0.980† ± 0.009 0.220† ± 0.189
CNN/RNN1 2561809 1:41:30 ± 1:36 47.2 ± 3.9 0.844 ± 0.030 0.625 ± 0.147 0.970† ± 0.017 0.248† ± 0.199
CNN/RNN2 7879917 2:54:41 ± 2:06 48.9 ± 5.4 0.810 ± 0.029 0.683 ± 0.143 0.945† ± 0.039 0.312† ± 0.161
LSTM0 412629 1:01:48 ± 1:34 39.2 ± 4.0 0.886 ± 0.008 0.543 ± 0.096 0.985† ± 0.004 0.185† ± 0.056
LSTM1 1465029 1:41:17 ± 2:33 39.1 ± 6.0 0.883 ± 0.060 0.572 ± 0.136 0.968† ± 0.097 0.254† ± 0.169
LSTM2 2746629 2:42:03 ± 3:28 67.7 ± 4.8 0.889 ± 0.011 0.459 ± 0.117 0.985† ± 0.006 0.198† ± 0.135
WaveNet0 1120409 0:51:48 ± 0:41 68.4 ± 13.8 0.796 ± 0.036 0.661 ± 0.143 0.936† ± 0.046 0.428† ± 0.241
WaveNet1 4362265 1:51:19 ± 0:55 79.4 ± 15.1 0.772 ± 0.024 0.711 ± 0.172 0.915† ± 0.039 0.558 ± 0.202
WaveNet2 17235737 5:01:33 ± 2:35 93.2 ± 20.3 0.798 ± 0.079 0.660 ± 0.142 0.922† ± 0.125 0.523 ± 0.296
Table 5.1: We note that our proposed classification methodology results in a significantly
higher AUC for all models under consideration. All models were trained and evaluated on a
NVIDIA Tesla V100 with 32GB VRAM provided by the Vermont Advanced Computing Core.
Training and performance metrics above are reported as the mean of thirty trials ± one
standard deviation. In total this table summarizes the results of 540 training and evaluation
trials. Total training time for the 540 models, not including hyper-parameter tuning, was
over 62 days. We the relative efficiency of WaveNet whose smallest configuration had the
fastest training time despite having over twice the parameters of the smallest model. ALAD
performance metrics marked with † are statistically distinct (two-sided t-test, p < 0.001)
from their TLAD counterpart. Evaluation time is how long it took the model to output the
probability distribution for all sequences in the test set. Bolded results are the best in their
respective column, and dataset combination.
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AUC TLAD FPR TLAD
(TPR = 1)
AUC ALAD FPR ALAD
(TPR = 1)
ADFA
Avg. CNN/RNN 0.800± 0.004 0.842± 0.030 0.985† ± 0.002 0.125† ± 0.027
ReLU. CNN/RNN 0.800± 0.004 0.847± 0.041 0.985† ± 0.002 0.131† ± 0.041
Avg. LSTM 0.765± 0.006 0.903± 0.079 0.966† ± 0.006 0.228† ± 0.030
ReLU. LSTM 0.766± 0.005 0.903± 0.079 0.966† ± 0.006 0.231† ± 0.029
Avg. WaveNet 0.870± 0.008 0.712± 0.071 0.998† ± 0.001 0.026† ± 0.005
ReLU. WaveNet 0.871± 0.008 0.692± 0.079 0.998† ± 0.001 0.027† ± 0.005
Hybrid0 0.800± 0.005 0.661± 0.023 0.975† ± 0.004 0.153† ± 0.030
ReLU. Hybrid0 0.801± 0.005 0.543± 0.050 0.976† ± 0.003 0.150† ± 0.030
Hybrid1 0.820± 0.009 0.609± 0.017 0.981† ± 0.007 0.098† ± 0.039
ReLU. Hybrid1 0.822± 0.009 0.504± 0.019 0.981† ± 0.007 0.100† ± 0.037
Hybrid2 0.847± 0.005 0.547± 0.029 0.990† ± 0.002 0.047† ± 0.008
ReLU. Hybrid2 0.848± 0.005 0.485± 0.034 0.990† ± 0.002 0.047† ± 0.008
PLAID
Avg. CNN/RNN 0.919± 0.012 0.499± 0.058 0.993† ± 0.004 0.119† ± 0.042
ReLU. CNN/RNN 0.919± 0.012 0.481± 0.050 0.994† ± 0.004 0.127† ± 0.051
Avg. LSTM 0.929± 0.020 0.394± 0.103 0.994† ± 0.009 0.099† ± 0.141
ReLU. LSTM 0.930± 0.012 0.380± 0.098 0.995† ± 0.006 0.098† ± 0.140
Avg. WaveNet 0.884± 0.055 0.559± 0.124 0.977† ± 0.055 0.197† ± 0.135
ReLU. WaveNet 0.886± 0.047 0.531± 0.058 0.978† ± 0.047 0.190† ± 0.098
Hybrid0 0.929± 0.003 0.477± 0.076 0.996† ± 0.001 0.063† ± 0.046
ReLU. Hybrid0 0.929± 0.003 0.466± 0.066 0.996† ± 0.001 0.065† ± 0.046
Hybrid1 0.922± 0.037 0.512± 0.118 0.989† ± 0.034 0.113† ± 0.165
ReLU. Hybrid1 0.923± 0.030 0.485± 0.066 0.990† ± 0.026 0.103† ± 0.125
Hybrid2 0.914± 0.054 0.479± 0.120 0.986† ± 0.050 0.092† ± 0.117
ReLU. Hybrid2 0.915± 0.049 0.459± 0.067 0.986† ± 0.048 0.089† ± 0.102
Table 5.2: Performance metrics for all ensembles under consideration. We note that
ALAD results in a significantly higher AUC for all ensembles under consideration. Homo-
geneous ensembles, designated by architecture, contain all three model configurations from
that architecture. Heterogeneous ensembles, termed hybrid, contain the the model from each
architecture at the given configuration level. Performance metrics above are reported as the
mean of thirty trials ± one standard deviation. ALAD performance metrics marked with †
are statistically distinct (two-sided t-test, p < 0.001) from their TLAD counterpart. Bolded
results are the best in their respective column, and dataset combination.
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(ROC) curve for our classifiers—a common means of evaluating binary classification
systems. The x-axis of the curve shows the false positive rate while the y-axis shows
the true positive rate. In this case, the curve visualizes the trade-off between detection
and false alarm rate. We summarize the performance of a model into a single value
using the Area Under Curve (AUC) metric. In addition, we report the False Positive
Rate (FPR) where the True Positive Rate (TPR) is one. The reported value for
a given metric such as AUC (discussed below in Section 5.2) is the mean of all 30
replicate trials. For ALAD the reported AUC is the mean of 900 operations- thirty
replicate trials each with thirty bootstrap groupings.
Finally, we also consider the same evaluation strategies for ensembles. We con-
sider two ensemble types: a simple averaging, and the ReLU ensemble method from
Kim et al. [68]. An ensemble of each type was constructed for each architecture and
configuration level, resulting in 12 total ensembles. All ensembles consist of three
models—either the three configurations from a given architecture, or the three differ-
ent base models with the same configuration index.
5.2 Results
We present performance metrics, namely ROC AUC and FPR at complete detection
for all models, in Table 5.1. Separate columns exist for both metrics over each com-
bination of model, dataset, and classifier method. These metrics are reported as the
mean of the thirty replicate trials ± one standard deviation. In all cases ALAD sig-
nificantly increased AUC (two-sided t-test, p-val < 0.001) when compared to TLAD.
We also observe a significant reduction in the FPR at complete detection in the vast
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(a) ADFA TLAD (b) ADFA ALAD
(c) PLAID TLAD (d) PLAID ALAD
Figure 5.2: ROC curves for the highest performing single model from each architecture
along with the highest performing ensemble on ADFA (top) and PLAID (Bottom). Models
were evaluated using both the TLAD(left) and ALAD(right). ROC curves show the mean
and standard deviation for thirty trials. The legend reports the mean AUC and its standard
deviation. For all models ALADsignificantly improved performance.
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(a) CNN/RNN (b) LSTM
(c) WaveNet (d) Hybrid
Figure 5.3: Figures 5.3a to 5.3c feature ROC curves for all trained models as well as homoge-
nous ensembles on ADFA. Figure 5.3d shows the ROC heterogeneous ensembles constructed
from model of all three architectures for each hyper-parameter configuration. ROC curves
show the mean and standard deviation for thirty trials using TLAD. The legend reports the
mean AUC and its standard deviation. We note that the LSTM and CNN/RNN ensembles
under-performed some of their constituents while the WaveNet ensembles performed better.
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(a) CNN/RNN (b) LSTM
(c) WaveNet (d) Hybrid
Figure 5.4: Figures 5.4a to 5.4c feature ROC curves for all trained models as well as
homogenous ensembles on PLAID. Figure 5.4d shows the ROC heterogeneous ensembles
constructed from model of all three architectures for each hyper-parameter configuration.
ROC curves show the mean and standard deviation for thirty trials using TLAD. The
legend reports the mean AUC and its standard deviation.
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Figure 5.5: Validation loss compared to performance for all models on the ADFA dataset.
Typically, one expects lower validation loss to correspond with higher performance. Here we
see no strong correlation between validation loss and performance. We note that anomaly
detection results in a special case as the training task (system call prediction), is not same
as the evaluation task (attack classification).
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majority of cases. WaveNet proved to be the strongest performer on ADFA while
LSTM models had the strongest performance on PLAID.
In Figure 5.1.5 we show ROC curves for the highest performing model from each
architecture, and the single best ensemble. We present our performance metrics for
all 12 ensembles in Table 5.2. The traditional TLAD is shown on the left, and our
proposed ALAD is on the right. We note the higher ROC curves when using ALAD
showing the lower false positive rates at all levels of detection. Of additional interest
is that there is no clear winner in terms of model architecture or even model size.
Models tended to have a higher performance on PLAID compared to ADFA-LD at
the trace level, except WaveNet.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show ROC curves for all models and ensembles on ADFA-LD
and PLAID respectively using TLAD. We use an identical evaluation methodology
to Kim et al. [68] and Chawla et al. [70] at the trace level, so we would expect model
performance to be similar to the original work despite the differing data splits and
training methodology. This was the case for our CNN/RNN models which had AUCs
similar to their originally reported values. We failed to replicate the high performance
at the trace level of Kim et al [68], but our smaller LSTM model performed similar to
the LSTM model used in Chawla et al. [70]. We did see a performance improvement
from the use of ensembles and note that the ReLU ensemble was the top performer for
both datasets, beating out the averaging and hybrid ensembles. Despite this we were
unable to replicate the strong performance of the ReLU ensemble shown in Kim et
al. [68] and note that its performance is virtually indistinguishable from the averaging
ensemble.
In Figure 5.5 we compare validation loss at the final epoch to model performance
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as measured by the ROC AUC score. One might expect a lower validation loss to
correspond with a higher ROC AUC score, however we do not observe this empirically.
In summary, ALAD resulted in a significant AUC improvement for all models
on all architectures and datasets under consideration. This improvement comes at
virtually no additional computational overhead, compared to TLAD.
5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Hypotheses
Testing our first of two hypotheses formulated in Section 5.1.1, namely that WaveNet
would be the top performing architecture, produced mixed results. On ADFA, the
dataset on which all models were tuned, WaveNet was indeed the top performer,
supporting our hypothesis. However, WaveNet was the poorest performer on PLAID.
There are two plausible explications for this behavior: WaveNet models may have
over fit to the training data, or the architecture could be more sensitive to tuning.
Our second hypothesis, namely that ALAD would yield superior performance
compared to TLAD, was fully supported by our analysis. For all models and datasets
under consideration there was a statistically significant (two-sided t-test, p-val <
0.001) improvement under ALAD. We speculated that this is due to the fact that
some attack traces may in fact be benign. This is an unavoidable artifact of the
collection methodology. The attack set contains all traces, each representing a distinct
process, of a program during a successful attack. The effects of a modern attack are
seen across multiple processes[50]. Precisely identifying the affected processes would
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require knowing exactly what system calls would have been issued in the absence of
an attack.
5.3.2 Practical Concerns & Use Cases
The information in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 allows practitioners considering a deep learning
IDS deployment to make informed decisions about the trade-offs between detection,
false alarms, and computational cost. These tables show the primary drawback of
deep learning powered IDS, long training and non-trivial evaluation times. For real-
time detection the time and computational requirements may be too expensive for
some applications. However, in addition to real-time detection, IDSs may also be used
in a retrospective analysis. In a retrospective analysis IDSs may be used to identify
which systems or applications were affected; helping analysts identify the impact of
a breach or informing their search.
While PLAID improves upon ADFA-LD there is still a need for more compre-
hensive datasets. To be effective IDSs must be trained on baseline data reflective
of their host. To meet this requirement practitioners must train the systems they
wish to deploy on data collected locally. Additionally, the system must be (at least
partially) retrained when any significant changes occur, such as the deployment of a
new application.
5.3.3 Implementation Decisions
A deployment of any form of anomaly detection requires practitioners to select a
threshold θ. This is an obstacle for practitioners as there is no way to know a priori
63
the estimated probability the model will assign an attack sequence. Fortunately,
there are two informed methods through which practitioners may select this value.
First, one may use results on an existing corpus such as PLAID or ADFA. Second,
one could utilize baseline sequences from their own production system; selecting a
threshold that results in FPR they are able to handle. Of course, while neither of
these choices guarantee complete detection they provide a means to achieve strong
performance with an anomaly-based IDS. There is no wrong choice for a threshold
value, only trade-offs between detection and false alarms.
Model selection is yet another obstacle for practitioners deploying a deep learning
powered IDS. Typically, in deep learning one performs this task by selecting the model
with the lowest validation loss. Unfortunately, we observed no strong correlation
between AUC and validation loss. For this reason we recommend practitioners select
their models based on their performance on reference datasets such as PLAID and
ADFA. Additionally, this result underscores the need for researchers to continue to
expand upon existing datasets.
Surprisingly, while we did see improvement from the use of ensemble, the effect
was small compared to the performance achieved by the highest performing models.
Additionally, while the ReLU ensembles outperformed their average ensemble coun-
terparts, performance gains were marginal. As the creation of an ensemble requires












Figure 5.6: Comparison of system call rankings between attack and baseline traces in
PLAID. Note that some of the most frequently utilized system calls, read and close, are
among the largest contributors to divergence.
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5.4 Visualizing Differences Between Base-
line and Attacks
While deep learning is an effective ML approach in many applications, it suffers from
its “black box”, uninterpretable nature. Although methods are being developed to
interpret deep learning models, they fall short, especially for insights into high-stakes
decision making [158]. This is not necessarily an argument against the use of deep
learning for HIDS since ML models are often just one component of a “observe, orient,
decide, act” loop in security operation centers that also incorporate human analysts.
However, interpreting data and predictive features in data is often critical for security
practitioners. Instead of leveraging ML models for computational insights, we argue
that other techniques can be leveraged, orthogonal to model development.
Two recently proposed techniques are “allotaxonometry” and “rank-turbulence
divergence” [73]. These highly general methods leverage information-theoretic tech-
niques for visualizing differences in datasets with complex structure, such as natural
language text, baby names, and mortality cause databases. These techniques are es-
pecially relevant in our application space, since anomaly-based HIDS rely on the fact
that significant differences exist between normal and malicious operations. Quantify-
ing such differences not only sheds light on features potentially exploited by models,
but also potentially new types of analysis. In this Section we explore the differ-
ences between attack and normal traces for both datasets used in this study, using
allotaxonometry and rank-turbulence divergence.
In figure 5.6 we display the differences between attack and normal uni-grams using
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an allotaxonograph. This instrument features a rank-turbulence histogram on the left,
and a rank-turbulence divergence shift on the right. We compute the relative rate of
usage for each uni-gram in the baseline and attack sequences separately, then order
system calls using tied-rank. Ranks for system calls that are found in one distribution
but not the other are replaced with the maximum rank of the joint distribution. The
2D histogram on the left displays the distribution of uni-grams found in the baseline
and attack sequences as well as the overlap between the two distributions. System
calls on the left side of the histogram are often used in the baseline sequences, whereas
system calls that are highlighted on the right side of the histogram are often used in
attack sequences. System calls which are used in both systems equivalently can be
seen in the middle.
Of particular interest is that commonly used system calls (e.g., open, close, and
times) display relatively high rank-turbulence divergence in both datasets. This is
in contrast to natural language where rankings of the most common words tend to be
stable across corpora [73]. Additionally, the most dangerous system calls [159] are not
top contributors to divergence. This suggests that focusing exclusively on dangerous
system calls could result in failures to detect intrusions. Additional allotaxonographs
of uni through tri grams of both datasets are in Appendix A.1. We also contrast the
raw frequencies of system calls found in baseline and attack traces for both datasets
in Appendix A.2.
In figure 5.7 we show that system call usage roughly follows an exponential rank
frequency distribution. The rank frequency system call bi and tri-grams appears to
approximate a power-law with an exponential cutoff in the tail. Natural language
corpora tend to be and stay power-law like for uni- through tri-grams with the tail
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Figure 5.7: Rank frequency plots of system calls for attack and baseline traces in ADFA-LD
(left) and PLAID (right). Fit lines were obtained using Huber regression. Observe that
system call usage roughly follows an exponential rank frequency distribution. This is differs
from natural language where word frequencies follow a power law distribution [1].
starting to flatten [1]. Thus, system call corpora become more power-law, while not
quite reaching a power-law distribution while natural language corpora continue to
follow a power-law distribution. Additional rank frequency plots for bi and trigrams
are located in Appendix A.2. In all of these figures we clearly see substantial differ-
ences between attack and normal system call distributions.
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Chapter 6
Application 2: Inefficiencies in the
U.S. equity markets
Leveraging the large number of securities under study and the broad range of market
capitalization (MC) covered, we examine scaling relationships between DSs, ROC,
and MC. DSs occur in equities of all sizes. While DS are more frequent in equities
with larger MC, the distributions of their qualities, such as their magnitude and
duration, are more extreme among equities with smaller MC. We find a strong positive
correlation between MC and ROC, show in Figure 6.1. A similar relationship is seen
between MC-total trades and MC-differing trades in Figure A.9. The majority of
ROC is generated by equities in the S&P 500 that are not also in the Dow (termed
the SPexDow). The SPexDow also Granger-causes ROC in other mutually-exclusive
market categories (Dow 30 and Russell 3000 less the S&P 500, or RexSP), pointing
to its centrality in the U.S. equities market.
In the following sections, we describe statistics of DSs, including distributions of start
times and durations. Next we move to analysis of ROC, providing summary statistics,
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Figure 6.1: Linear and quadratic regression between Market Capitalization (MC) and ROC
in doubly-logarithmic space. There is a strong positive relationship between MC and ROC.
The data exhibits interesting nonlinearity and heteroskedasticity, where equities with smaller
MC have higher variance in the dependent variable, while equities with larger MC have
generally lower variance. Note that equities in the financial sector have a consistently lower
ROC relative to MC while equities in the energy sector have a consistently higher ROC
relative to MC. The shaded area surrounding the regression curves indicate 95% confidence
intervals for the true curves, calculated using bootstrapping techniques.
70
comparisons across mutually-exclusive market categories, and correlation along with
Granger-causality analyses. We close with a brief exploration of exchange-traded
funds (ETFs), a discussion of results, and possibilities for future work.
6.1 Methods
Our work investigates the occurrence of DSs and ROC arising from quote discrep-
ancies between the SIP and direct feeds. Similar concepts have been discussed in
empirical market microstructure literature [22, 78, 160, 161, 162], though formal def-
initions vary. We follow the definitions described below.
Dislocations Suppose that there exist two market data feeds, F1 and F2, each display-
ing quotes for a single asset. Quotes have the form qi(t) = (bi(t),mi(t), oi(t), ni(t)),
where i ∈ 1, 2, bi(t) is the bid price at time t, oi(t) is the offer priceat time t, mi(t)
and ni(t) are the number of shares associated with the bid and offer at time t re-
spectively. We observe these feeds from a single, fixed location in Carteret, NJ. A
dislocation between these sources of data occurs when the prices of the quotes differ,
e.g. b1(t) 6= b2(t) or o1(t) 6= o2(t). A DS occurs when the quotes differ and the relation-
ship between the quoted prices remains constant, e.g. b1(t) < b2(t) or b1(t) > b2(t).
More formally we represent dislocation segments as a 4-tuple:
vn = (tstartn , tendn , min ∆p, max ∆p). (6.1)
The maximum (resp. minimum) value of the dislocation segment are simply the max-
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Figure 6.2: We depict the dissemination of a market event to a subset of core participants
in the national market system. The left panel visualizes the the plumbing connecting our
participants; NYSE and SIP tape A co-located in Mahwah, NJ and Nasdaq along with our
observer co-located in Carteret, NJ. All participants subscribe to both the SIP (blue) and
direct feeds (red) from both exchanges. We show the flow of information as a sequence of
enumerated events depicted as rectangular documents. The right panel displays the best bid
and offer observed by the participants at each event from both the SIP (blue) and direct feeds
(red). Note that while Nasdaq and our observer remain in sync for this entire example this is
not always the case. We start at step zero with a market in harmony, that is all participants
observe the same price on all feeds. Within the same microsecond NYSE processes an order
resulting in a new best bid that narrows the spread. NYSE quickly dispatches a message of
the top-of-book change to the SIP and its direct feed customers. Five microseconds later [2,
3] NYSE’s message arrives at the SIP which takes an additional 92µs [4] to process the
information and dispatch a new NBBO. After another five microseconds NYSE receives the
new NBBO from its co-located SIP. It’s not for another 180µs, 282µs after the original
message the subscribers to NYSE’s direct feed in Carteret receive the message. At this point
we observe a 1g dislocation between the BBO displayed on the direct feeds and the observed
NBBO. This dislocation persists for 97µs at which time the SIP update arrives in Carteret.
Note that while technological advances will result in this sequence of events unfolding faster,
the core behavior will remain unchanged. Messages from direct feeds travel a single leg,
from exchange to subscriber, while updates to the NBBO require two legs, exchange to SIP
to subscriber.
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imum (resp. minimum) difference in the prices that are generating the dislocation
segment over the time period [tstartn , tendn ). The time period [tstartn , tendn ) is determined
by identifying a contiguous period of time where ∆p > 0 or ∆p < 0. From the above
quantities the duration of the dislocation segment can also be calculated. The quan-
tity ∆p(t) is the difference in the price displayed by the information feeds at time
t as measured and timestamped by our observer in Carteret. From the definitions
of max ∆p and min ∆p the reader will note that dislocation segments will tend to
feature min(|min ∆p|) ≥ $0.01, since the minimum tick size in the NMS is set at
one penny for securities with a share price of at least $1.00. In collating dislocation
data, we record the maximum and minimum value of each dislocation segment rather
than a time-weighted average of dislocation value or other statistic for the sake of
simplicity. In much of our analysis we take the absolute values of the maximum
and minimum values of each dislocation segment as the fundamental object of study
as any dislocation, regardless of which feed is favored, presents an opportunity for
market inefficiency.
Figure 6.2 walks through an example DS occurring on a subset of the NMS using
estimates of message transit and processing time for each leg of the journey. In our
example a DS starts when a message regarding a quote change in Mahwah reaches
our observer in Carteret via a direct feed and ends when the same message arrives
via the SIP 92µs later. In this single example we see three factors that either alone,
or in combination, may cause DSs; differences in processing time, transfer speed, and
route (SIP messages require an additional leg). In this example the dislocation was
triggered by a single top of book change at NYSE. However, dislocations can occur
due to sequences of events occurring across multiple exchanges and SIP processors.
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Recall that by definition a DS requires two feeds. TAQ data contains only the quotes
resulting in a NBBO change as well as all trades. In contrast our dataset contains all
quotes sent along the direct feeds as well as all SIP updates. Thus, we can observe
events such as our example in Figure 6.2, an impossibility with TAQ data.
Realized Opportunity Cost Using the two market data feeds F1, F2 from dislo-
cation definition above we calculate the ROC of using F1 in place of F2 by combining
quote and trade information. Assume that trades take the form Tj = (pj, vj, tj),
where pj is the execution price, vj is the number of traded shares, and tj is the exe-
cution time. If a trade executes at one of the currently quoted prices, e.g. b1(tj), then
the ROC is given by (b2(tj) − b1(tj)) ∗ vj. If the trade executes on the opposite side
of the book, e.g. o2(tj), then the ROC is given by (o1(tj) − o2(tj)) ∗ vj. This allows
for a consistent interpretation of the values, where a positive value indicates that F2
displayed a better price for the active trader (higher bid or lower offer) than F1. The
total ROC over an interval [S, E] is obtained by taking the sum of ROC values from
all trades that occurred in that interval.
We first compute summary statistics and qualitative descriptions of the distributions
of DSs and ROC. Additionally, we leverage the large sample of equities to conduct
a cross-sectional study of the effect of company “size” on these microstructure quan-
tities. We quantify the notion of size of a company by both its MC and its rank
in relation to other companies. We also investigate index inclusion effects through
the use of disjoint sets of equities and compute aggregate statistics across these sets.
Since the S&P 500 is a strict superset of the Dow 30 and the Russell 3000 is a strict
superset of the S&P 500, the natural division of the superset of all equities under
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study is split into three distinct classes: the Dow 30, the S&P 500 excluding the Dow
30 (SPexDOW), and the Russell 3000 excluding the S&P 500 (RexSP). We investigate
correlations between these disjoint subsets, and characterize the statistical properties
of the time series of DSs and ROC across these disjoint categories. We further explore
the relationship between these categories by conducting a Granger causality analysis
of aggregated ROC time series [163].
The next section gives results on DSs, including summary statistics and regressions
of DSs against MC. We then discuss structure in the intra-day distribution of DS
start times and DS duration. Following this, we provide statistics of the ROC across
the market as a whole and again within mutually-exclusive market categories. We
then explore statistical properties of the ROC time series. We close with an overview




DSs can occur when quotes displayed by distinct information feeds differ. We cata-
loged all DSs occurring in the equities under study and present summary statistics
along with qualitative comparisons of their distributions and higher-order moment
statistics. Table A.1 - A.3 display means of summary statistics of DSs for each
mutually-exclusive market category under study.
We will use the notation 〈fA〉 to denote an average of the quantity f conditioned
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Figure 6.3: Histograms of the base-10 logarithm of minimum magnitude, maximum magni-
tude, and duration of dislocation segments in the RexSP without conditioning on duration
or magnitude. The distributions are leptokurtic, with the log-distributions of minimum and
maximum magnitude presenting a long right tail and the distribution of log-duration dis-
playing a rough bell-shape.
on the condition A. These averages are interpreted as the quantity f conditioned
on condition A averaged over all securities and all times of observation; defining the






f has condition A
fn. (6.2)
Tables A.1 - A.3 show that, on average, there were more DSs in Dow 30 securities
than in SPexDow or RexSP securities. However, the average maximum magnitude of
DSs in the Dow30 is lower than those of the SPexDow, which in turn are lower than
those of the RexSP. In particular, actionable DSs (those with duration > 545µs)
with magnitude > $0.01 exhibit more extreme behavior in the SPexDow and RexSP
than in the Dow. On average, the median maximum magnitude in the Dow 30




' $0.023, while in
76









' $0.045, a roughly one-cent increase in
the median maximum magnitude of a DS in each mutually-exclusive market category.
Examples of distributions of these quantities are given in Figure 6.3, where the dis-
tributions of the means of minimum magnitude, maximum magnitude, and duration
are plotted for the RexSP.
These results provide evidence for the existence of a MC scaling effect in DSs. Se-
curities with larger MC tend to feature higher trading volume and more frequent
occurrence of DSs, but these DSs tend to be smaller in magnitude on average. More
frequent trading implies a lower probability that prices across differing information
feeds will diverge by large magnitudes.
Since DSs are not distributed evenly throughout the day in the Dow 30 [26], we
examine their distribution in the SPexDow and the RexSP as well. Appendix A.4
contains figures displaying the distribution of DS start times plotted modulo day
and aggregated over the year as well as figures displaying the distribution of DS
durations for each mutually exclusive market category. Distributions are plotted both
without conditioning, conditioned on duration, as well as conditioned on duration and
magnitude.
Distributions of start times display predictable structure. In all market categories,
there are large peaks at the very beginning and end of the trading day (circa 9:30
AM and 4:00 PM), along with a noticeable and sudden increase in density around
2:00 PM. The peak in density that occurs at the end of the day is most noticeable
when the distribution of start times is not conditioned on DS size. These observa-
tions correspond with the results found for the Dow 30 in [26]. However, along with
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these granular observations, there also exists structure on shorter timescales. The
distribution exhibits self-similarity on the half-hour timescale, with large peaks every
half-hour and decreasing density toward a sudden peak at the next half-hour. There
is also structure at the five-minute timescale that is noticeable before the 2:00 PM
spike in density but does not appear to be present after the spike. (Future work could
statistically test for the presence of this structure and for its persistence across mul-
tiple timescales.) The structure on shorter timescales is present in all distributions
but, again, is more pronounced in distributions not conditioned on magnitude.
Distributions of DS duration are extremely heavy tailed, so we plot them with a log-
transformed horizontal axis. All DS duration distributions exhibit one or more peaks
in the range 10−4s ≤ log10 duration ≤ 10−3s, but there is also a distinct and much
lower peak in the distribution near approximately one second in length.
S&P 500 Inclusion Effect: Dislocations As a visual aid to these results, we
have included circle plots, as introduced in [26], to demonstrate the non-uniform
distribution of DSs that can occur. Figure 6.4 shows these circle plots for two common
stock pairs ((PBI, INCR), (BRK.B, XOM)) on the edges of our indices. The first pair
is the smallest common stock in the S&P 500′ by MC that remained in the S&P 500
for the entire calender year and the closest component by MC in the RexSP, PBI
and INCR respectively. The second pair is the only mega cap in the RexSP and the
closest component by MC in the S&P 500′ that remained in the S&P 500 for the entire
calender year, BRK.B and XOM respectively. We note that BRK.A is not included
in the Russell 3000 [149] and that XOM is additionally included in the DOW. These
common stock pairs underscore the difference in behavior between constituents of the
78
S&P 500 and those not included in the most worlds most widely tracked equity index.
Figure 6.4 displays the DSs for the above-mentioned common stocks aggregated
over a year (modulo day). We see that DSs appear to be more concentrated for S&P
500 constituents with spikes occurring at the beginning of the trading day and at 2:00
pm. Additionally, DSs for S&P 500 constituents tend to have smaller magnitudes,
relative to Russell 3000 constituents. We provide circle plots for many more securities
on our webpage [164].
6.2.2 Market capitalization
Further evidence for scaling behavior arises from analysis of MC. Tables 4.2 and 4.1
display MC statistics broken down by industry sector and categorical size, e.g., micro-
cap, mega-cap, etc. MC is significantly positively correlated with ROC. Tables A.13
- A.16 display results from ordinary least squares regressions predicting ROC using
MC and other predictors. A linear fit predicting log10 ROC from log10 MC, log10
total trades, and log10 differing trades gives R2 ' 0.908. A positive coefficient relates
log10 ROC to log10 MC, indicating that higher MC is associated with higher ROC.
A similar regression is computed including quadratic terms in log10 MC, which has a
significant, but weak, negative association with ROC. Similar relationships hold for
both the linear and quadratic models when the dependent variable is instead chosen
to be total or differing trades.
Though behavior of ROC as a function of MC is generally similar when equities are
stratified by sector, some sectors display lower average levels of ROC, differing trades,
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Figure 6.4: Dislocation segments (DS) for stock pairs (similar MC) aggregated over a year
(modulo day). PBI (paired with INCR) is the smallest common stock by MC under consid-
eration that remained in the S&P 500 for all of 2016. BRK.B (paired with XOM) is the
only mega cap in the RexSP. We see that DSs appear to be more concentrated for S&P 500
constituents (left) with spikes occurring at the beginning of the trading day and at 2:00 pm.
Additionally, we note that DSs appear to a smaller magnitude for S&P 500 constituents.
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or total trades when MC is held constant. Equities classified as being in the financial
sector generally have a smaller amount of ROC, while equities classified as being in
the energy sector exhibit a higher amount of ROC on average. However, there is no
clear general trend linking sectors to MC or to ROC.
6.2.3 Realized opportunity cost
As expected with an increase in the number of analyzed equities from 30 to more
than 2900, the amount of ROC rose substantially from the quantity reported in [26],
from $160M to $2.05B USD. ROC clearly displays sublinear scaling with the number
of studied equities; we do not observe a thousandfold increase in the amount of ROC
with a thousandfold increase in the number of equities. The information advantage
afforded traders with access to direct feed information is not uniform; though a vast
majority of the ROC ($1.91 B) favored the direct feeds in this way, a non-negligible
amount of ROC ($137 M) did favor the SIP feeds. Approximately a quarter (23.71%)
of all trades observed occurred during a dislocation. The fraction of “differing traded
value”—the nominal market value of all differing trades—was slightly higher (25.25%)
than the fraction of all trades that were differing trades. The ratio between these two
values (25.25% / 23.71% = 1.0651) shows that the average differing trade moves
approximately 6.51% more value than the average trade. This indicates a qualitative
shift in trading behavior during dislocations.
Securities in the SPexDow account for a median of 2,006,091 differing trades per day,
in contrast to the 309,158 in the Dow 30 or 1,921,121 in the RexSP. The median
differing traded value per day in the SPexDow was also the highest among the three
categories, totaling approximately $14.07T versus the RexSP’s total of $6.7T and
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BRK.B XOM PBI INCR
MC ($) 401,644,421,120 374,280,552,448 2,821,674,240 2,820,235,520
ROC ($) 2,278,835.98 8,846,416.18 726,596.69 487,049.13
Trades 5,120,595 16,146,652 2,360,470 904,613
Diff. Trades 1,544,050 4,479,209 488,092 243,855
Traded Val. ($) 70,435,832,686.71 169,057,336,872.77 5,766,285,837.56 3,989,174,661.59
Diff. Traded Val. ($) 24,162,015,573.13 47,541,675,580.93 1,257,265,907.34 1,016,834,174.82
Table 6.1: Summary statistics for select common stock pairs. BRK.B (paired with XOM)
is the only mega cap in the RexSP. PBI (paired with INCR) is the smallest common stock
by MC under consideration that remained in the S&P 500 for all of 2016. Note that those
in the S&P 500 (green) have a much higher trading volume and ROC then their similarly
capitalized counterparts.
the Dow’s total of $3.27T. ROC per share differed across the three categories, with
median ROC per share per day of 1.1g, 1.5g, 2.1gfor the Dow, SPexDow, and RexSP
respectively. ROC per share tends to increase as MC decreases, with lowest ROC
per share occurring in the Dow and highest ROC per share occurring in the RexSP.
Median total ROC per day on the Dow amounted to $514.8K, while median total
ROC per day on the SPexDow totaled $3.384M and on the RexSP amounted to
$3.564M. Summary statistics for distributions of ROC for each mutually-exclusive
market category are given in Table A.7.
It is interesting to consider the distribution of both total ROC and ROC per share
by both equity and mutually-exclusive market category. Figure A.10 displays ROC
of the top 30 and bottom 30 of all securities under study when ranked by ROC.
Included in this figure for comparison is the exchange-traded fund SPY, an ETF that
tracks the S&P 500. Selected ETFs are also treated separately in Section 6.2.4. It
is notable that the equity with the largest ROC, Bank of America (BAC), has more
than twice the ROC of the equity with the second-largest amount of ROC, Verizon
(VZ). Though not an equity and not included in the rest of this study, it is also
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Stat. Mean Std.
MC ($) 3,695,890,099.20 ± 464,930,329.633,696,678,400.00 ± 465,021,263.08
ROC ($)† 1,530,766.70 ± 1,212,566.32573,704.19 ± 454,901.87
Trades† 3,757,345.30 ± 2,579,005.781,340,988.30 ± 1,099,357.71
Diff. Trades† 848,648.80 ± 568,393.92318,163.00 ± 222,699.69
Traded Value ($)† 11,966,521,828.32 ± 6,995,211,619.344,281,159,071.68 ± 2,466,969,453.45
Diff. Traded Value ($)† 2,930,334,696.21 ± 1,746,456,767.921,071,563,501.93 ± 551,246,762.12
Table 6.2: Comparison of the smallest ten common stocks that remained in the S&P 500 for
all of 2016 (green) and the ten RexSP common stocks with the closest MC. Rows marked
with † have significantly (two-sided t-test, p < 0.05) higher values for common stocks in the
S&P 500. We note that common stocks in the S&P 500 have nearly three times the trading
activity and ROC than their similarly capitalized counterparts.
83
notable that SPY, one of the most heavily traded securities on the NMS along with
BAC, is close to BAC in ROC. Of the top 30 securities with the most ROC, eight of
the 30 are Dow 30 equities. Only four out of 30 are RexSP equities, while the other
17 non-ETF securities are SPexDow equities. One may attribute this to MC, though
we note the S&P 500 is not the largest 500 U.S. companies 4.2. In fact, there are
612 RexSP constituents with a MC greater than PBI, a common stock at the bottom
of the S&P 500. This includes 67 large and mega cap common stocks. Since the
S&P 500 appears to be the primary driver of ROC across all equities (c.f. below), we
find the top 30 and bottom 30 S&P 500 securities ranked by ROC, including Dow
30 securities, and plot their ROC in Figure A.11. Even in this subset, only 10 of the
top 30 equities are Dow 30 securities. However, when the unit of analysis changes
to ROC per share, as in Figure A.12, we find that RexSP equities fill 27 out of 30
top ranks, which corresponds with the aggregated statistics reported in Table A.7.
Additionally, we revisit our common stock pairs from 6.2.1 to take a closer look at
common stocks barely inside and outside of the S&P 500. We see that the common
stocks in the S&P 500 have a much higher trading volume and ROC then their
similarly capitalized counterparts 6.1. To see if this trend holds we expand our set
to the ten smallest common stocks that remained in the S&P 500 for all of 2016 and
the ten RexSP common stocks with the closest MC. None of the ten RexSP members
spent any time in the S&P 500 during 2016. We find the trend holds with members
of the S&P 500 having nearly three times the trading activity and ROC than their
similarly capitalized counterparts 6.1.
Since there appear to be differences between the (stationary) summary statistics of
the mutually-exclusive market categories, it is reasonable that there may be signifi-
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cant differences between the ROC statistics considered as time-dependent stochastic
processes and simply considered as random variables decoupled from time. Within
each category, the ROC was computed for all equities in that category for each day.
Each ROC series is then normalized as ri 7→ ri−〈ri〉√Var(ri) , which allows direct comparison
of the series. Figure A.16 displays a quantile-quantile plot of the Dow, SPexDow,
and RexSP ROC distributions. The Dow distribution is plotted as linear and the
other two distributions are compared with it. It is immediately obvious that the
left tails of the SPexDow and RexSP distributions are heavier than that of the Dow;
this also appears to be the case for the right tails of the distributions, but there is
little sampling in this region and so no conclusion can be drawn. This similarity of
the SPexDow and RexSP distributions is also striking; when normalized they appear
almost identical.
Figure A.17 displays the time-dependent sample paths of ROC sampled at daily
resolution. These processes are anti-autocorrelated—they display mean reversion—
as evidenced by their detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) [165] exponents of αDow =
0.438, αSPexDow = 0.242, and αRexSP = 0.235. All series exhibit rare large values from
time to time, with the Dow ROC series exhibiting the largest rare values relative to
its mean fluctuations and the SPexDow series exhibiting the smallest. We also note
that, in accordance with the QQ plot of the time-decoupled distributions above, the
DFA exponents of the SPexDow and RexSP—and thus their corresponding dynamical
behavior—are closer than they are to the Dow DFA exponent.
A review of the above results points to the SPexDow as being the “dominant" mutually-
exclusive market category in some sense: it accounts for a plurality of differing trades,
differing traded value, and total ROC, while also having a DFA exponent lower than
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that of the Dow and close in value to that of the RexSP, meaning that its time-series of
ROC is strongly mean-reverting. The amalgamation of these facts can be interpreted
as evidence that the SPexDow ROC time series is possibly least likely to be influenced
by the other series of ROC. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a number of Granger
causality tests on the time series of ROC. Granger causality is the notion that past
values of one time series may be useful in predicting current and future values of
another time series [163]. A maximum lag of 40 days was set and four tests were cal-
culated pairwise between each of the three mutually-exclusive market categories: sum
of squared residuals χ2-test, a likelihood ratio test, sum of squared residuals F -test,
and a Wald test. We consider there to be a significant Granger causality between
series when all four tests indicate significant Granger causality at the p = 0.05/Nlags
confidence level. The correction for multiple comparisons is done using the most con-
servative estimate, the Bonferroni correction, to minimize the probability of Type I
error [166]. Figure 6.5 displays the results of these tests graphically as a directed
network. The direction of edges denotes the direction of the Granger-causal relation-
ship between the categories, while the weights on the edges denote the total number
of lags for which the relationship was significant. The SPexDow is shown to signifi-
cantly influence both the Dow and RexSP while not being significantly influenced by
either category; this provides strong evidence to support our above hypothesis. We
note that the SPY tracks the S&P 500, is one of the most heavily-traded securities,
and has the second-highest amount of ROC of the securities under study here. The
SPY’s price dynamics and ROC may thus have a material effect on the relationships
between the S&P 500’s ROC and those of the other market categories, providing a








Figure 6.5: Network of relationships between mutually-exclusive market categories implied
by results of four Granger causality tests. The direction of the edges gives the direction of
the Granger-causal relationship, while the weight on the edge is the total number of lags for
which the relationship was significant at the p = 0.05/Nlags level (the conservative Bonferroni
correction). The maximum number of lags was chosen to be Nlags = 40. Thickness of the
edge is proportional to edge weight and is plotted for emphasis in visualization. Details about
which lags were associated with significant Granger causality can be found in Table A.12.
may be a mutually-causal relationship between the real S&P 500 and the ETF that
tracks it. The RexSP and Dow have a mutually Granger-causal relationship, with the
Dow exerting more influence on the RexSP than the other way around. This finding
corresponds with the ranking of categories on a total shares traded per number of
equities basis; this is not a surprising result. We also find that the SPexDow exerts
far less influence on the RexSP than does the Dow (four total lags for the SPexDow
versus 23 total lags for the Dow), a fact for which we do not have a ready explanation.
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ROC: Dow SPexDow RexSP
Dow 1.000000 0.451072 0.319018
SPexDow 0.451072 1.000000 0.724903
RexSP 0.319018 0.724903 1.000000
ROC / Share: Dow SPexDow RexSP
Dow 1.000000 0.103061 -0.019662
SPexDow 0.103067 1.000000 0.411443
RexSP -0.019662 0.411443 1.000000
Table 6.3: Pearson correlation matrices of mutually-exclusive market categories. For each
index subset a daily resolution time series is constructed for the given statistic over all stocks
in the index subset. For the ROC series the ROC generated for each stock on a particular
trading day is summed, while in the ROC per share case the values are averaged. The
correlation coefficients are then calculated between pairs of time series in order to construct
the tables above. The top table displays ROC correlations, while the bottom table displays
ROC per share correlations. The ROC per share statistic normalizes the number of traded
shares, allowing for a fair comparison between the more heavily traded stocks in the Dow 30
or S&P 500 subset with the more lightly traded stocks in the Russell 3000 subset.
Providing further evidence for the above hypothesis, we compute Pearson correlations
between pairs of mutually exclusive categories for both ROC and ROC per share; these
results are displayed in Table 6.3.
ROC correlations are strongest between SPexDow and RexSP (ρ = 0.72) and
SPexDow and Dow (ρ = 0.45), while the correlation between the RexSP and Dow
is lower (ρ = 0.31). ROC per share correlations are universally lower than those for
ROC, but the correlations between SPexDow and RexSP (ρ = 0.41) and SPexDow
and Dow (ρ = 0.10) are still higher than that between RexSP and Dow (ρ = −0.01),
which is actually negative.
Figure A.13 displays the distributions of daily total ROC in 2016 by mutually-
exclusive market category. The panel with linear scaling highlights the extremely
heavy-tailed nature of these distributions, while the log scaled panel provides a bet-
88
ter comparison between the mutually-exclusive market categories. On average, mem-
bers of the Dow 30 experience the greatest daily ROC, followed by members of the
SPexDow, followed by members of the RexSP. It seems likely that the kurtosis of
the theoretical distributions do not exist, implying tail exponent γ < 4 in the dis-
tribution Pr(X > x) ∼ x−(γ−1). Table A.8 displays the skew and kurtosis for each
distribution. If we examine the daily ROC per share in a similar manner, which is
shown in Figure A.14, we observe a reversal of the previous relationship. Members
of the Dow 30 have the least daily ROC per share, on average, and members of the
RexSP have the most. Though there is a slight trend, more ROC per share in less
frequently traded stocks, the distributions of all three groups are nearly centered at
1g per share. This corresponds well with our expectations based on the structure of
the system and the distribution of DS magnitudes shown in Figure 6.3.
6.2.4 ETFs
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are securities that trade on the NMS and are designed
to mimic as closely as possible a particular portfolio of other securities. They are thus
governed by the same price discovery mechanism as other securities that trade on the
NMS, as opposed to the end-of-day price discovery mechanism to which mutual funds
are subjected, but also allow investors to own a portion of potentially many underlying
assets (or at least a simulacrum of such), similar to a mutual fund. Here, we briefly
remark on the similarities and differences between ETFs designed to track subsets of
the market and those subsets of the market themselves. We calculate statistics on
the DSs and ROC associated to ETFs from three firms (Vanguard, iShares, Russell)
for three indices (S&P 500, Russell 300, Russell 2000), for a total of nine ETFs
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(SPY, VOO, IVV, THRK, VTHR, IWV, TWOK, VTWO, IWN). The Russell 2000
is comprised of the smallest 2000 firms in the Russell 3000 by MC. The S&P 500 and
Russell 3000 were selected as measures of overall market activity while the Russell
2000 was selected to isolate dynamics among ETFs that track smaller equities.
Table A.9 summarizes ROC statistics for the ETFs under study. The fraction of
differing trades and differing traded value are lower than for any of the indexes as
a whole; in fact, the ratio of the fraction of differing traded value to the fraction of
differing trades is less than one. Total ROC incurred from trades in ETFs studied here
totaled over $38 million in calendar year 2016. This statistic provides some evidence
to suggest that ETFs have their own endogenous statistical behavior that differs from




This dissertation has developed new quantitative methods for exploring the behavior
of two computational systems. In the first application we developed new methods for
host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS). In the second application we showed
that market inefficiencies in the form of dislocations and realized opportunity cost
were common and of non-negligible frequency and size. These results are used to
establish baselines for their respective systems; allowing practitioners, by they security
personnel, investors, or regulators to better understand and evaluate the state of the
system they are operating in.
7.1 Host-Based Intrusion Detection
Our fundamental approach to intrusion detection is to develop models for predicting
“normal” aka baseline behavior, and then leveraging those models to detect malicious
behavior as anomalistic. This approach has the benefit of being able to detect novel
attacks, as well as known ones. We used deep learning models to achieve high levels
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of prediction performance.
Our work makes four primary contributions in the area of HIDS research. First,
we collected and publicly released PLAID, a new system-call dataset for develop-
ing and evaluating IDS. Second, we developed ALAD (Application-Level Anomaly
Detection), a new classification method for anomaly-based IDS. Third, we presented
the largest comparison to date of deep learning architectures applied to this domain.
Fourth, we explored new visualization methods, based on information-theoretic cor-
pus divergence measures, for exploring HIDS datasets.
Evaluating the performance of advanced methods, such as alternative deep learn-
ing models, requires comprehensive benchmarking that cannot be accomplished with
the use of a single dataset. In our own architecture comparison, the use of either
PLAID or ADFA-LD independently might lead to a conclusive answer that is differ-
ent from the relatively inconclusive results that we observed during a comprehensive
evaluation. By introducing PLAID, we hope to empower the community to better
evaluate new and existing HIDS models.
ALAD offered significantly better performance than TLAD regardless of the se-
lected deep learning architecture or training dataset. This indicates that the inclusion
of a relatively minimal piece of meta-data, application-level labels, can greatly im-
pact IDS performance. The consistent benefit of ALAD begs the question, what
other data or meta-data elements should be considered when constructing HIDS?
The results of our architecture search were fairly inconclusive with respect to clas-
sification performance, with WaveNet performing best on ADFA-LD and the LSTM
model performing best on PLAID. However, WaveNet required approximately 60%
less training time to converge on both ADFA-LD and PLAID when compared with
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similarly sized LSTM and GRU models. Thus, practitioners looking to train deep
learning empowered HIDS quickly or scale up to massive data sets may prefer archi-
tectures composed primarily of convolutions over those composed of recurrent layers.
In our application of allotaxonographs to ADFA-LD and PLAID we identified clear
differences between system calls created by baseline and malicious behavior. These
differences may lead to additional insights into datasets why deep learning models out
perform traditional machine learning models for HIDS. Future work should continue
to investigate quantitative methods for corpus divergence in order to improve the
interpretability of HIDS.
Overall, our results represent a significant improvement in the state-of-the-art
in anomaly-based HIDS. We provide a useful new dataset for the broader HIDS
research community, and a blueprint for developing deep learning empowered HIDS
by presenting clear evaluation methodologies and reproducible results. Finally, we
highlight opportunities for adapting these tools to particular domains.
7.2 Market Inefficencies
We show that total ROC in Russell 3000 securities was well in excess of $2 billion USD
during 2016. While consistent with the two comprehensive studies of the modern U.S.
market [75, 77], our ROC calculations provide the first empirical evidence explaining
how traders might profitably exploit market dislocations, despite paying up to $2.0B
USD annually for order flow [111].
Compounding these results, we provide strong statistical evidence that the S&P 500
excluding Dow 30 securities, to which we refer as the SPexDow, is the primary driver
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of ROC among the three mutually exclusive categories of equities (Dow 30, SPexDow,
and Russell 3000 excluding S&P 500 securities, or the RexSP).
Compounding the above results, we find that structure in the distributions of DS start
times and duration persist across the entire Russell 3000, indicating some broader
microstructure-based proximate cause of this structure. Distributions of DS duration
exhibit a large peak between 10−4 and 10−3 seconds (100 microseconds to one mil-
lisecond), but also exhibit a second smaller, yet distinct, peak near one second. This
separation of timescales in the distribution provide evidence for the existence of at
least two distinct proximate causes of DS. Distributions of DS start times display even
more intricate structure, with large peaks at the beginning and end of the trading
day, self-similarity on the half-hour and ten-minute timescales, and a large spike at
2:00 P..
ROC was highest among SPexDow securities, but ROC per share was highest among
RexSP securities, which were also the most lightly-traded securities. All time series of
ROC exhibit behavior of anti-autocorrelation, meaning that they are mean-reverting.
ROC in the SPexDow Granger-cause ROC in the other market categories, but the
converse is not true; while the Dow Granger-causes the RexSP, the RexSP only weakly
Granger-causes the Dow and does not have any effect on the SPexDow.
Taken together, these results paint the picture of a NMS the physical structure of
which generates effects that are persistent across size of equity and exchange. Ampli-
fying these persistent effects is the apparent central role of the SPexDow; in number
of DSs, amount of ROC, spectral properties of ROC time series, and Granger-causal
relationships, the story emerges of the SPexDow’s characteristics being generated
by largely-endogenous factors and subsequently influencing the characteristics of the
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Dow and RexSP. Future work could explore in more depth the extent to which
microstructure effects arising first in the SPexDow then spread to other mutually ex-
clusive market categories and propagate through time. This work could also explore
the evolutionary dynamics of the modern NMS from its birth following the financial
crisis of 2007/8 to the present day. The NMS may not have remained static, with
a constant number of market centers and a stationary distribution of market agents
and trading strategies, but rather may have experienced fluctuations in the number of
exchanges, in the regulatory environment, and in strategy profiles of trading agents.
Such an analysis could pave the way for better informed modelling efforts and the
advancement of market theory.
7.3 Application Similarities
Despite the disparate application domains and use cases commonalities were discov-
ered. A discovery of particular interest is the importance of relatively minor meta-
data. The inclusion of application-level labels significantly improved the performance
of IDSs, and a common stock’s inclusion in the S&P 500 appears to have a significant
impact on ROC and DSs. This finding underscores the importance of data cura-
tion and suggests that the inclusion and creation of meta-data should be carefully
considered.
The processes of detecting cyber intrusion and establishing baseline behavior of finan-
cial markets are not necessarily all that different. Though they were not considered in
this dissertation we note similarity between frequency based approaches to intrusion
detection and our DSs analysis. In a similar vein, there exists a class of traders who
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make decisions quickly on short sequences of events similar to our ALAD pipeline.
Finally, both applications were developed for evolving systems. Developers of IDSs
must adapt their systems to emerging attack methods, and a changing computational
landscape, such as moving from single to multi-processed applications. Similarly, the
NMS is constantly changing, as of writing new exchanges are coming online and
sweeping changes to regulations are under consideration.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of system call rankings between attack and baseline traces in
ADFA-LD. Note that some of the most frequently utilized system calls, poll and read,
are among the largest contributors to divergence. Of additional interest is that the most















Figure A.2: Comparison of system call bi-gram rankings between attack and baseline traces
in ADFA-LD. Similar to uni-grams frequent bi-grams remain top contributors to divergence.















Figure A.3: Comparison of system call bi-gram rankings between attack and baseline traces
in PLAID. Similar to uni-grams frequent bi-grams remain top contributors to divergence.



















Figure A.4: Comparison of system call tri-gram rankings between attack and baseline traces
in ADFA-LD. A slightly larger portion of tri-grams are present only in one set compared to











Figure A.5: Comparison of system call tri-gram rankings between attack and baseline traces
in PLAID. A slightly larger portion of tri-grams are present only in one set compared to
bi-grams. This suggests that longer n-grams help to differentiate between sets.
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A.2 System Call Frequencies
Figure A.6: Rank frequency plots of system call bi (top) abd tri (bottom) grams for attack
and baseline traces in ADFA-LD (left) and PLAID (right). The rank frequency appears to
approximate a power-law with an exponential cutoff in the tail. Natural language corpora
tend to be and stay power-law like for uni through tri-grams with the tail starting to flatten.
In contrast to system call corpora which become more power law like.
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Figure A.7: Comparison of system call usage between baseline and attack traces in ADFA-
LD. System calls are in monotonically non-increasing order base on their frequency in base-
line traces. Notice that usages of individual system calls differ significantly between sets.
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Figure A.8: Comparison of system call usage between baseline and attack traces in PLAID.
System calls are in monotonically non-increasing order base on their frequency in baseline
traces. Notice that usages of individual system calls differ significantly between sets. Of




1 Realized Opportunity Cost $2,013,458,668.87
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $1,876,048,519.06
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $137,410,149.76
4 Trades 4,658,307,833
5 Diff. Trades 1,105,201,803
6 Traded Value $24,352,760,600,270.47
7 Diff. Traded Value $6,272,439,590,589.91
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.73
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.76
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0855
RexSP
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $948,743,328.62
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $911,950,130.85
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $36,793,197.77
4 Trades 2,093,415,072
5 Diff. Trades 482,055,297
6 Traded Value $6,669,357,410,332.23
7 Diff. Traded Value $1,705,272,719,045.67
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.03
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.57
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.1104
S&P 500′
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $1,064,715,340.25
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $964,098,388.26
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $100,616,951.99
4 Trades 2,564,892,761
5 Diff. Trades 623,146,506
6 Traded Value $18,429,250,470,003.83
7 Diff. Traded Value $4,567,166,871,544.24
8 Percent Diff. Trades 24.30
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.83
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0631
SPexDow
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $904,501,417.30
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $842,017,261.86
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $62,484,155.44
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4 Trades 2,172,791,182
5 Diff. Trades 535,714,275
6 Traded Value $13,824,440,155,934.76
7 Diff. Traded Value $3,666,630,946,582.52
8 Percent Diff. Trades 24.66
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 26.52
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0757
Dow 30′
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $160,213,922.95
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $122,081,126.40
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $38,132,796.55
4 Trades 392,101,579
5 Diff. Trades 87,432,231
6 Traded Value $3,858,963,034,003.48
7 Diff. Traded Value $900,535,924,961.72
8 Percent Diff. Trades 22.30
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 23.34
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0465
Table A.5: Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost (ROC) for various equity groups
under study during 2016.
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Conditioned min magnitude ($) max magnitude ($) duration (s)
None
count 4,011,848.7333
mean 0.0110 0.0136 0.075413
std 0.0391 0.2725 5.829465
min 0.0100 0.0100 <0.000001
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000248
50% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000669
75% 0.0100 0.0103 0.001253
max 44.6933 279.2057 8,408.931478
Duration
count 2,169,106.5333
mean 0.0108 0.0149 0.132779
std 0.0436 0.3548 7.645375
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.000546
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000783
50% 0.0100 0.0100 0.001129
75% 0.0100 0.0107 0.002654




mean 0.0427 0.2370 0.955731
std 0.3355 1.6130 48.214785
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.000546
25% 0.0200 0.0200 0.000698
50% 0.0200 0.0227 0.001073
75% 0.0307 0.0433 0.003552
max 43.4150 114.3480 7,186.866464
Table A.1: Mean of dislocation segment summary statistics taken across the 30 members of
the Dow. 545µs is used for duration conditioning and $0.01 is used for magnitude condi-
tioning.
122
Conditioned min magnitude ($) max magnitude ($) duration (s)
None
count 2,525,082.0448
mean 0.0135 0.0168 0.252981
std 0.2801 0.3996 9.325161
min 0.0100 0.0100 <0.000001
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000227
50% 0.0100 0.0101 0.000583
75% 0.0115 0.0136 0.001085
max 476.1177 522.6072 9,084.040084
Duration
count 1,189,460.6682
mean 0.0134 0.0185 0.555820
std 0.4601 0.6076 13.029491
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.000546
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000754
50% 0.0102 0.0107 0.001119
75% 0.0117 0.0160 0.008169




mean 0.0557 0.1249 1.591543
std 1.9177 2.5050 54.064998
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.000546
25% 0.0202 0.0209 0.000717
50% 0.0228 0.0346 0.001240
75% 0.0375 0.0625 0.027820
max 471.7331 506.9715 6,943.106256
Table A.2: Mean of dislocation segment summary statistics taken across 446 members of
the SPexDow. 545µs is used for duration conditioning and $0.01 is used for magnitude
conditioning.
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Conditioned min magnitude ($) max magnitude ($) duration (s)
None
count 770,577.8246
mean 0.9734 1.1361 4.413179
std 34.0534 37.7472 50.079342
min 0.0100 0.0100 <0.000001
25% 0.0116 0.0121 0.000245
50% 0.0139 0.0149 0.001042
75% 0.0225 0.0302 0.013774
max 2,238.1205 2,514.9617 8,796.956807
Duration
count 287,399.7217
mean 1.2116 1.7162 12.749530
std 37.6277 46.3599 83.465004
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.000546
25% 0.0110 0.0118 0.002065
50% 0.0147 0.0188 0.072213
75% 0.0263 0.0408 0.975526




mean 2.1734 3.0486 13.154607
std 53.2211 66.0958 112.101259
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.000546
25% 0.0239 0.0272 0.003933
50% 0.0338 0.0449 0.053583
75% 0.0611 0.0806 0.798791
max 2,033.9931 2,295.6782 7,139.075345
Table A.3: Mean of dislocation segment summary statistics taken across the 2451 members
of the RexSP. 545µs is used for duration conditioning and $0.01 is used for magnitude
conditioning.
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Conditioned min magnitude ($) max magnitude ($) duration (s)
None
count 6,431,595.4444
mean 0.0216 0.0273 0.339145
std 0.0856 0.1027 13.327128
min 0.0100 0.0100 <0.000001
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000284
50% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000602
75% 0.0122 0.0156 0.001175
max 9.0956 9.3744 5,658.596041
Duration
count 3,674,884.7778
mean 0.0223 0.0289 0.683211
std 0.0859 0.1077 18.991011
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.000546
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.000726
50% 0.0100 0.0111 0.001064
75% 0.0122 0.0167 0.002494




mean 0.1707 0.1800 0.933693
std 0.2804 0.2995 26.558084
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.000546
25% 0.0200 0.0200 0.000765
50% 0.0344 0.0411 0.001213
75% 0.1733 0.2933 0.005725
max 6.3278 8.4311 5,005.870452
Table A.4: Mean of dislocation segment summary statistics taken across the 9 ETFs under
study. 545µs is used for duration conditioning and $0.01 is used for magnitude conditioning.
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Trades Traded Val. ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Val. ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share
count 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991
mean 6,460.98 33,776,788.61 1,532.89 8,699,747.42 2,792.63 0.020880
std 13,249.67 109,021,779.70 3,036.98 25,738,960.57 17,611.14 0.087810
min 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 599 1,118,022.02 101 199,882.83 237.6100 0.009510
50% 2,020 5,316,322.22 450 1,246,241.41 826.6000 0.011448
75% 6,478 24,797,793.44 1,600 6,525,124.17 2,578.75 0.018836
max 517,270 8,280,915,338.59 103,885 1,596,912,962.05 6,798,041.07 19.3381
Table A.6: Purse statistics for all stocks under study in 2016. The data used to construct
this table is aggregated by date and stock, resulting in 720,991 data points that correspond
with the 731,556 combinations of 252 trading days in 2016 and 2903 stocks under study.






mean 18,485,348.54 96,637,938,889.96 4,385,721.44 24,890,633,295.99 7,989,915.35 0.023073
std 3,705,825.95 17,507,577,514.36 1,222,558.47 5,929,581,247.64 2,363,234.20 0.003143
min 7,045,815 41,324,500,835.46 1,197,040 8,277,978,080.59 2,717,631.16 0.018414
25% 16,178,390 85,348,849,125.71 3,674,541 21,481,677,427.57 6,560,601.80 0.020888
50% 17,837,416.50 94,176,286,443.74 4,257,438.50 24,165,074,815.55 7,524,560.38 0.022379
75% 20,114,165.50 103,932,196,142.46 4,964,932.50 27,054,706,014.87 8,884,110.40 0.024693




mean 8,307,202.67 26,465,704,009.25 1,912,917.85 6,766,955,234.31 3,764,854.48 0.022109
std 1,370,512.88 3,786,979,882.64 473,884.96 1,299,054,438.46 1,048,372.83 0.002874
min 3,183,224 11,363,776,182.38 487,500 2,268,729,995.29 1,436,093.46 0.017744
25% 7,528,810.25 24,222,297,224.76 1,648,499.25 6,053,458,251.52 3,182,173.91 0.020092
50% 8,175,352.50 26,166,834,634.22 1,921,121.50 6,779,433,456.68 3,564,482.05 0.021393
75% 9,061,096.50 28,685,877,060.20 2,161,350.50 7,599,965,429.85 4,206,538.80 0.023737





mean 10,178,145.88 70,172,234,880.71 2,472,803.60 18,123,678,061.68 4,225,060.87 0.014624
std 2,406,751.15 14,303,150,882.94 775,201.38 4,760,162,875.50 1,531,548.30 0.002019
min 3,862,591 29,960,724,653.08 709,540 5,941,906,620.96 1,281,537.70 0.011127
25% 8,716,552.50 60,764,387,798.11 2,034,844.50 15,251,685,767.67 3,371,948.52 0.013502
50% 9,684,039 67,776,548,100.32 2,310,806 17,479,288,594.91 3,918,496.70 0.014407
75% 11,120,226.50 75,672,607,052.02 2,783,838.50 20,074,235,595.26 4,654,693.39 0.015434





mean 8,622,187.23 54,858,889,507.68 2,125,850.30 14,550,122,803.90 3,589,291.34 0.014818
std 1,960,102.37 10,686,728,768.81 632,025.23 3,571,347,460.11 1,119,395.15 0.002029
min 3,283,385 23,296,053,599.93 619,976 4,906,051,591.25 1,136,332.05 0.011271
25% 7,398,970.25 48,123,050,130.46 1,762,152.75 12,329,749,894.94 2,915,802.29 0.013729
50% 8,237,387.50 53,383,376,977.72 2,006,091.50 14,073,439,429.50 3,384,654.11 0.014579
75% 9,405,905.75 59,188,646,444.18 2,398,085.25 15,973,362,072.81 4,050,343.31 0.015660





mean 1,555,958.65 15,313,345,373.03 346,953.30 3,573,555,257.78 635,769.54 0.011792
std 463,558.93 3,891,299,900.31 146,677.85 1,234,882,079.43 655,911.15 0.008071
min 579,206 6,664,671,053.15 89,564 1,035,855,029.71 145,205.65 0.008879
25% 1,278,813.25 12,915,031,172.08 262,209 2,804,569,367.64 417,485.73 0.009667
50% 1,429,062 14,431,597,662.01 309,158 3,274,390,601.60 514,856.64 0.010213
75% 1,715,351.25 16,829,521,684.38 387,772 3,993,470,514.97 666,268.27 0.011288
max 3,596,006 30,999,914,293.66 1,073,029 9,428,952,387.10 7,817,684.58 0.093108
Table A.7: Aggregated purse statistics for different groups of securities in 2016. Each section
is composed of date aggregated data, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the






Table A.8: Skew and kurtosis for daily ROC by mutually-exclusive market category, high-
lighting the remarkably heavy-tailed nature of these distributions.
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $38,458,070.79
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $37,970,135.30
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $487,935.49
4 Trades 86,725,286
5 Diff. Trades 19,612,214
6 Traded Value $3,678,242,397,422.43
7 Diff. Traded Value $804,917,872,051.93
8 Percent Diff. Trades 22.61
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 21.88
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 0.9677
Table A.9: Summary statistics for realized opportunity cost (ROC) observed in the ETFs
under study. It is notable that, of all market subsets we study, only this small subset has a
ratio of the fraction of differing traded value to fraction of differing trades with value below
unity. On a per-trade basis, this means that there is on average less potential for ROC.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share
mean 38,391.01 1,628,261,353.44 8,681.81 356,316,012.42 17,024.38 0.021169
std 106,302.46 4,663,474,508.49 23,900.69 1,033,570,406.20 48,481.79 0.043449
min 1 72.4600 0 0 0 0
25% 14 262,574.18 3 48,125.50 35.0000 0.008350
50% 683 15,165,081.37 181 3,386,159.33 455.2200 0.009997
75% 12,121.50 283,540,074.38 4,136 93,960,790.38 6,033.43 0.014408
max 974,888 40,617,035,891.21 251,657 11,028,368,359.92 499,906.77 1.0200
Table A.10: Aggregated purse statistics for the ETFs under study. The data used to con-
struct this table is aggregated by date and instrument, resulting in 2,259 data points that
correspond with the 2,268 combinations of 252 trading days in 2016 and 9 ETFs under
study.
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Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share
mean 344,147.96 14,596,199,989.77 77,826.25 3,194,118,539.89 152,611.39 0.189762
std 157,107.76 6,043,079,696.41 45,179.00 1,675,731,349.39 85,509.19 0.118446
min 113,860 5,018,912,183.01 14,610 703,559,994.91 30,989.52 0.054358
25% 237,021.25 10,471,387,904.01 47,237.50 2,052,459,478.17 94,488.20 0.106098
50% 308,705 13,005,695,875.47 66,509 2,780,132,908 131,084.42 0.169572
75% 394,822.25 16,641,275,220.96 94,108 3,799,483,257.76 186,174.78 0.256871
max 1,177,148 44,900,644,748.00 339,480 12,945,336,256.63 616,859.86 1.0963
Table A.11: Aggregated purse statistics for the ETFs under study. The data used to con-
struct this table is aggregated by date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the




Figure A.9: Relationships between Market Capitalization (MC) and total trades (top) or
differing trades (bottom). Similar to Figure ??, there is a strong positive relationship in both
regressions, along with the same nonlinearity and heteroskedasticity. The data are well-fit
by linear and quadratic functions in doubly-logarithmic space. The shaded area surrounding
the regression curves indicate 95% confidence intervals for the true curves, calculated using
bootstrapping techniques.
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Figure A.10: ROC by ticker ($) for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30 (right panel) of
all securities under study, ranked by ROC. Constituents of the Dow 30 are shown in blue,
constituents of the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are shown in green, constituents of the
Russell 3000 (excluding the S&P 500) are shown in red, and ETFs are shown in black.
Figure A.11: ROC by ticker ($) for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30 (right panel) of
S&P 500 securities, ranked by ROC. Constituents of the Dow 30 are shown in blue, while
those belonging to the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are shown in green.
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Figure A.12: ROC per share ($ / share) by ticker for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30
(right panel) of all securities under study, ranked by ROC. Constituents of the Dow 30 are
shown in blue, constituents of the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are shown in green, and
constituents of the Russell 3000 (excluding the S&P 500) are shown in red.
Figure A.13: Distributions of mean ROC per day over the members of each mutually exclu-
sive market category. Linear (left) and log 10 (right) vertical axis scaling are used to provide
additional perspective. On average, members of the Dow experience more ROC than mem-
bers of the SPexDow, which experience more ROC than the RexSP. These distributions are
extremely heavy tailed, thus the use of log scaling, and feature a high degree of overlap. Thus
there are members from each category that experience high ROC and low ROC.
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Figure A.14: Distributions of mean ROC per share per day ($ / day) over the members
of each mutually exclusive market category. Linear (left) and log 10 (right) vertical axis
scaling are used to provide additional perspective. On average, the members of the Dow
experience the least ROC per share, followed by the SPexDow, followed by the RexSP.
Figure A.15: Equities are plotted in rank-order of ROC per traded value; the 0-th equity
has highest ROC per traded value. The first over-100 top equities are in the RexSP, which
is unsurprising due to their combination of generally lower liquidity and lower share prices.
Blue markers are associated with constituents of the Dow 30, green markers with constituents
of the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30), red markers with constituents of the Russell 3000
(excluding the S&P 500), and black markers with ETFs.
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Figure A.16: Empirical quantile-quantile (QQ) plot for the normalized ROC per share pro-
cesses. It is clear that the distribution of the SPexDow and RexSP processes are similar,
and both are markedly different from the Dow process (blue line).
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Figure A.17: Normalized ROC per share processes. There is one observation per day for
a total of 252 observations in the process. These processes are anti-autocorrelated (Dow
DFA exponent α = 0.434, SPexDow DFA exponent α = 0.226, RexSP DFA exponent α =
0.301) and exhibit rare large values. The lower panel provides evidence for nonlinear cross-
correlation between the SPexDow and RexSP ROC per share processes.
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Figure A.18: Distributions of dislocation segment duration. Columns are associated with an
index (left to right: Dow 30, S&P 500 excluding the Dow 30, Russell 3000 excluding the S&P
500) and rows are associated with conditioning strategies (top to bottom: no conditioning,
magnitude greater than $0.01).
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Figure A.19: Distributions of dislocation segment start time. Columns are associated with
an index (left to right: Dow 30, S&P 500 excluding the Dow 30, Russell 3000 excluding the
S&P 500) and rows are associated with conditioning strategies (top to bottom: no condi-





Dow → RexSP 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, . . . , 37
Dow → SPexDow
SPexDow → Dow 1, . . . , 10, 15,. . . ,24, 26, 30, . . . , 34
SPexDow → RexSP 1, 2, 3, 4
RexSP → Dow 1, 3, 35, 36
RexSP → SPexDow
Table A.12: Granger causality results for pairwise combinations of mutually-exclusive mar-
ket category under study. Statistical significance was assessed using four Granger causality
tests (parameter F -test, sum of squared residuals F -test, likelihood-ratio test, χ2-test). Each
causal relationship was considered significant if each of the four tests resulted in a p-value
less than 0.05/Nlags. The maximum number of lags investigated was Nlags = 40.
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Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.908
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.908
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 7179.
No. Observations: 2884 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Df Residuals: 2880 Log-Likelihood: 551.07
Df Model: 3 AIC: -1094.
BIC: -1070.
Omnibus: 1630.431 Durbin-Watson: 2.007
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 23812.396
Skew: 2.375 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 16.252 Cond. No. 259.
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 1.0052 0.091 11.050 0.000 0.827 1.183
l_MarketCap 0.1183 0.011 10.675 0.000 0.097 0.140
l_total_trades -0.2203 0.043 -5.127 0.000 -0.304 -0.136
l_differing_trades 0.9023 0.040 22.286 0.000 0.823 0.982
Table A.13: Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost (ROC)
using market capitalization, differing trades, and total trades.
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Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.925
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.925
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 5970.
No. Observations: 2884 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Df Residuals: 2877 Log-Likelihood: 846.73
Df Model: 6 AIC: -1679.
BIC: -1638.
Omnibus: 1952.210 Durbin-Watson: 1.988
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 50808.169
Skew: 2.831 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 22.768 Cond. No. 1.70e+04
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 7.8666 0.802 9.811 0.000 6.295 9.438
l_MarketCap -0.0738 0.149 -0.496 0.620 -0.365 0.218
l_total_trades -4.1661 0.432 -9.638 0.000 -5.013 -3.319
l_differing_trades 3.0804 0.338 9.103 0.000 2.417 3.744
l_MarketCap ** 2 0.0067 0.008 0.837 0.402 -0.009 0.022
l_total_trades ** 2 0.3385 0.038 8.936 0.000 0.264 0.413
l_differing_trades ** 2 -0.2042 0.034 -6.002 0.000 -0.271 -0.138
Table A.14: Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost (ROC)
using market capitalization, differing trades, and total trades. Quadratic terms are included.
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Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.600
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.600
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 4280.
No. Observations: 2884 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Df Residuals: 2882 Log-Likelihood: -1574.9
Df Model: 1 AIC: 3154.
BIC: 3166.
Omnibus: 52.492 Durbin-Watson: 1.933
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 76.592
Skew: 0.199 Prob(JB): 2.34e-17
Kurtosis: 3.692 Cond. No. 126.
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept -1.4415 0.108 -13.398 0.000 -1.652 -1.231
l_MarketCap 0.7368 0.011 65.422 0.000 0.715 0.759
Table A.15: Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost (ROC)
using only market capitalization.
Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.603
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.603
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 2904.
No. Observations: 2884 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Df Residuals: 2881 Log-Likelihood: -1564.7
Df Model: 2 AIC: 3135.
BIC: 3153.
Omnibus: 67.584 Durbin-Watson: 1.935
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 100.782
Skew: 0.242 Prob(JB): 1.30e-22
Kurtosis: 3.777 Cond. No. 1.24e+04
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept -6.2441 1.286 -4.857 0.000 -8.764 -3.724
l_MarketCap 1.7575 0.266 6.598 0.000 1.235 2.280
l_MarketCap ** 2 -0.0539 0.014 -3.927 0.000 -0.081 -0.027
Table A.16: Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost (ROC)
using only market capitalization. Quadratic terms are included.
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